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THE PENDULUM OF JUSTICE: ANALYZING THE INDIGENT
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
WHEN PLEADING NOT GUILTY AT THE PLEA BARGAINING STAGE
TARA HARRISON*
I. INTRODUCTION: AN ISSUE WITH Two STRONG POSITIONS

On October 9,2001, members of the Silent Aryan Warriors kidnapped a man
in Salt Lake County.! The warriors covered his head and upper torso with a sheet,
wrapped his wrists and ankles with duct tape, and drove him to a rural area. 2 One
warrior dragged the man thirty feet off the road and dropped an eighty-three pound
rock on his head, killing him. 3 The police, fortunately, found the warrior who
committed the murder. The State prosecuted him, and a jury convicted him. 4 The
court then sentenced him to consecutive prison terms of five years to life and
fifteen years to life. 5
The criminal justice system was unable to prevent the tragic death of an
innocent man, but succeeded in finding and eventually sentencing the individual
responsible. Citizens reflecting on this situation could feel a sense of satisfaction in
an effective system.
However, the convicted defendant has appealed his conviction,6 not on the
issue of guilt or innocence, nor on the issue of receiving a fair trial, but rather on
the amount of time he is required to serve in prison. He has not questioned the
sentencing guidelines; rather, he has questioned the competence of his attorney
prior to trial. He argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed
to conduct a reasonable pretrial investigation. 7 The defendant asserts that this
failure prejudiced him because it deprived him of the benefit of a plea bargain. 8 In
other words, he would have pled guilty and thereby received a lighter sentence if
his counsel had performed a more thorough investigation of the strength of the
State's case.
In courts across the country, other defendants have raised the same claim,
ineffective assistance of counsel at plea bargaining, for varying reasons: counsel

*
1

Staff Member, Utah lAw Review.
Brief of Respondent at 3, State v. Grueber, 2005 UT App 480U.

I d.
I d.
4 I d. at 2.
5 I d.
2

3

6 The Utah Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the State. State v. Grueber, 2005 UT
App 480U. However, the Utah Supreme Court has granted certiorari, State v. Grueber, 133
P.3d 437 (Utah 2006).
7 Grueber, 2005 UT App 480U.
8

I d.
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failed to convey a plea offer,9 counsel rejected a plea offer without defendant's
permission,10 counsel failed to accurately inform defendant of the elements of the
accused crime,Il and counsel failed to properly inform defendant of the sentencing
guidelines l2-the length of sentence he could serve if convicted at trial.
Competing policies and competing legal analyses wrestle to reach an
appropriate resolution in such cases. In State v. Grueber (Grueber), the case
mentioned above, a jury found the defendant guilty of kidnapping and murder.
Justice demands punishment, but to what degree? Logic reasons that, if the
defendant's counsel had been effective, the defendant could have worked out a
plea bargain with the state. Fairness demands that he be given back that
opportunity.
The sense of unfairness intensifies when one recognizes that the defendant's
deprivation occurred in part because of his poverty, Counsel appointed for indigent
defendants is far more likely to perform deficiently than counsel hired and paid for
by the defendant. 13 The Supreme Court has created safeguards for defendants who
receive the ineffective assistance of counsel. I4 However, the question to be
addressed is whether these safeguards apply to counsel's assistance at the plea
bargaining stage when the defendant pleads not guilty, or whether these safeguards
are reserved to ensure the constitutional right to a fair trial. If these safeguards do
not apply outside of the right to a fair trial, then wealthy defendants inevitably
receive far greater advantage over indigent defendants during the plea bargaining
process because financial resources can ensure effective assistance even where the

9 E.g., United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994); Rasmussen v.
State, 658 S.W.2d 867, 867-68 (Ark. 1983); Cottle v. State, 733 So. 2d 963, 964-65 (Fla.
1999); Lloyd v. State, 373 S.E.2d 1, 2 (Ga. 1988); Lyles v. State, 382 N.E.2d 991, 993
(Ind. Ct. App. 1978); Williams v. State, 605 A.2d 103, 105 (Md. 1992); State v. Simmons,
309 S.E.2d 493,496 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); Hanzelka v. State, 682 S.W.2d 385,386 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1984); Becton v. Hun, 516 S.E.2d 762,764 (W. Va. 1999).
10 E.g., Lyles, 382 N.E. 2d at 993.
11 E.g., State v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671, 672 (Iowa 1986).
12 E.g., United States v. Herrera, 412 F.3d 577, 579 (5th Cir. 2005); Magana v.
Hofbauer, 2001 FED App. 0291P, 263 F.3d 542,545 (6th Cir.); United States v. Gordon,
156 F.3d 376, 377 (2d Cir. 1998); Engelen v. United States, 68 F.3d 238, 240 (8th Cir.
1995); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 40 (3d Cir. 1992); People v. Curry, 687 N.E.2d
877, 883 (111. 1997).
13 See Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongful Conviction: Theoretical
Implications and Practical Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REv. 337, 370-73 (2006) (discussing
prevalent problems defendants experience with appointed counsel); see also Adele
Bernhard, Effective Assistance of Counsel, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTNES ON
FAILED JUSTICE 220, 225-26 (Sandra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2000).
14 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 774 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(describing the right to effective assistance of counsel as a "safeguard" against
"'miscarriages of justice'" (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,496 (1986))).
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law is silent. 1s Indigent defendants, therefore, who are more often subject to
ineffective assistance,16 are more likely to agree to longer sentences during plea
bargaining or even find themselves assigned stricter sentences after a conviction at
trial 17 when a plea bargain would have been a viable option had counsel provided
them with adequate representation.
The discussion section of this Note looks in depth at how the courts determine
whether the ineffective assistance of counsel safeguards should apply to plea
bargaining assistance. Broadly, courts have looked to interpretations of the Sixth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel,18 modem Supreme Court case law, the
balance of interests in justice and fairness, and other external factors. The majority
of courts have concluded that the right does apply to all outcomes of the plea
bargaining stage. 19 A minority of courts have concluded that the right does not
apply to plea bargains when the defendant pleads not guilty.2o To understand these
positions as well as determine the best approach to the problem, it is necessary to
understand the history behind the Sixth Amendment, the evolution of the right to
counsel through Supreme Court precedent, and the evolution of plea bargaining.
II. BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF THE RIGHT To COUNSEL
AND THE EVOLUTION OF PLEA BARGAINING

A. History ofand Intent behind the Right to Counsel
The historical backdrop of the colonists' intentions behind the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel reveals the right originated to protect individual

15 See, e.g., Bob Sablatura, Study Confirms Money Counts in County's Courts: Those
Using Appointed Lawyers Are Twice as Likely to Serve Time, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 17,
1999, at Al (presenting revealing statistics for Harris County, Texas: 43% of defendants
with hired counsel received probation while only 26% of defendants with appointed
counsel received probation; 23% of defendants with hired counsel had their cases
dismissed while only 14% of defendants with appointed counsel had their cases dismissed;
and most significantly, only 29% of defendants with hired counsel were sentenced to jail or
prison while 58% of defendants with appointed counsel were sentenced to jail or prison).
16 Medwed, supra note 13, at 370-73.
17 Todd R. Falzone, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: A Plea Bargain Lost, 28
CAL. W. L. REv. 431,431-32 (1992) (explaining that defendants who receive ineffective
counsel that causes them to plead not guilty likely encounter much stiffer sentences after a
trial conviction than what they would through a plea bargain); see also Hans Zeisel, The
Disposition of Felony Arrests, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 407, 444-49 (estimating a
forty-two percent increase in the severity of sentences offered at trial as opposed to those
obtained through guilty pleas).
18 U.S. CaNST. amend. VI.
19 This includes all federal circuit and most state courts that have decided this issue.
See infra note 62.
20 These courts are in Louisiana, Missouri, Tennessee, and Utah. See infra note 63.
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freedom and create a fair playing field between a legally uneducated defendant and
a legally competent prosecution.
The early colonists expressed and demonstrated a desire to bring a greater
focus on the individual in legal proceedings. While the right to legal representation
arose in England in 1688 after the Revolution,21 the English limited the right to
felonies of treason until 1836?2 The colonists sought a justice system that was
governed more by the people than by a few powerful elite. A trend formed in the
seventeenth century "toward popular, nontechnical administration of justice.,,23
The right to counsel, public trials, and jury trials arose from this trend. 24 In 1676,
West Jersey documented the following law: "that no person or persons shall be
compelled to fee any attorney or councilor to plead his cause, but that all persons
have free liberty to plead his own cause.,,25 Thus, West Jersey established the right
to a pro se defense.
In the late seventeenth century, professional lawyers gained recognition in
colonial society.26 Educated in England, these lawyers brought the English
modifications enacted after the Revolution of 1688?? Colonists associated the new
liberties regarding witnesses and counsel with the aims of greater freedom that
overthrew the Stuarts and Tories. 28 Pennsylvania boldly declared, "that all
Criminals shall have the same Privileges of Witnesses and Council as their
Prosecutors.,,29
The Supreme Court recognized that, "[a]fter the Declaration of
Independence ... rights basic to the making of a defense, entered the new state
constitutions in wholesale fashion. The right to counsel was clearly thought to
supplement the primary right of the accused to defend himself.,,30 When contesting
the adoption of the United States Constitution at the Massachusetts Convention,
Holmes stated, "The mode of trial is altogether indetermined; whether the criminal
is to be allowed the benefit of counsel ... [t]hese are matters of by no means small

21 FRANCIS HOWARD HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 10 (1951) (citing 7 Will. 3,
c.3 (1695) (Eng.)).
22 I d. (citing 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114 (Eng.)).
23 I d. at 17.

24

I d.

25

I d.

26

Id.

at 20 (citing CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR passim

(1911)).
27

I d.

28

Id.

29

PA. CHARTER OF PRNILEGES, art. V (1701); see HELLER, supra note 21, at 20

(citin~ PA. CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES,

art. V (1701)).
o Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 829 (1975).
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consequence ....,,31 The right to counsel was subsequently included in the Bill of
Rights as part of the Sixth Amendment.
Originally, the right to counsel was a right of the accused, not an obligation of
the govemment. 32 However, in 1938 Justice Black writing .for the Supreme Court
majority stated, "The Sixth Amendment withholds from the federal courts, in all
criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or
liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.,,33 Therefore, it became
necessary for courts to appoint counsel when a defendant was unable to retain
counsel. Of significance was Justice Black's rationale: "the average defendant does
not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a
tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented
by experienced and learned counsel.,,34
Thus, the historical backdrop to the modem application of the right to counsel
indicates that the right exists to protect individual freedom and level the playing
field between the legally unlearned defendant and the competent prosecution.

B. Interpreting the Sixth Amendment Ri-ght to the Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees, "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed ... and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.,,35 The
Supreme Court expressly connected the enumerated right to the assistance of
counsel with the initial clause of the Amendment, "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to ... the Assistance' of Counsel.,,36 Thereby, the
Court appears to limit the right to counsel by tying it to the right's role in ensuring
a fair trial. 37

31 HELLER, supra note 21, at 26 (quoting 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 109-11

(1835)).
32

Alexander Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U.

L.Q. REv. 1, 8 (1944).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
Id. at 462-63.
35 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
36 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1967); see also Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that a person accused of a federal or state crime
has the right to have counsel appointed if retained counsel cannot be obtained).
37 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (noting that "the right to the
effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect
it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trail").
33

34
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The Court also explained that inherent in the right to counsel is the principle
of effectiveness: 38 Counsel must assist effectively; otherwise the defendant's right
to counsel has been violated. 39 Furthermore, the right to counsel extends to all
"critical stages of the proceedings" that affect the tria1. 40 Critical stages include
lineups,41 arraignments,42 and guilty pleas.43 All of these confrontations require the
effective assistance of counsel to "preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair
trial.,,44 Thus in light of early definitions of critical stages, the purpose of the right
to counsel remained the guarantee of a fair trial. The court has since expanded the
scope of the right, recognizing that certain pretrial proceedings can impact the
fairness of the later trial.
In 1984, the Supreme Court not only expanded the scope of critical stages, but
the Court also established the modern test to determine whether counsel was
ineffective. 45 Previously, only pretrial proceedings were considered critical, based
on their ability to impact the later trial. Strickland v. Washington (Strickland)
reasoned that the right to effective assistance extends to capital sentencing
proceedings because they are "sufficiently like a trial in [their] adversarial format
and in the existence of standards for decision.,,46 Thus, Strickland expanded the

38 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) ("That a person who happens
to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the
constitutional command. The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of
counsel because it envisions counsel is playing a role that is critical to the ability of the
adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an
attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial
is fair."); see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) ("It has long been
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."
(citing Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85,90 (1955); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
69-70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444,446 (1940); and Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 57 (1932))).
39 Powell, 287 U.S. at 53; see also Wade, 388 U.S. at 224-25 (1967).
40 Wade, 388 U.S. at 224.
41 Id. at 227-28.
42 White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53
(1961).
43 Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475 (1945) (recognizing that "[t]he decision to
plead guilty is a decision to allow a judgment of conviction to be entered without a
hearing-a decision which is irrevocable and which forecloses any possibility of
establishing innocence"). Thus, because a guilty plea forecloses a later trial, counsel is
necessary to ensure that the result is just; otherwise, the right to a fair trial has been
violated.
44 Wade, 388 U.S. at 227.
45 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984).
46 Id. However, petitions for writ of habeas corpus do not implicate the right to
counsel because they do not constitute a criminal prosecution or a critical stage.
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). While not a constitutional right, the right

2006]

INDIGENT DEFENDANT RIGHTS

1191

scope of the right to counsel to include proceedings outside the previously
recognized "critical stages" to proceedings that have (1) an adversarial format, and
(2) a standard for governing their decisions.
Strickland also established the modem two-pronged test for ineffective
assistance: (1) whether counsel performed deficiently; and (2) whether the
deficiency prejudiced the defendant. 47 A defendant must meet both prongs,
otherwise his claim fails. 48
The first prong, deficient performance, places a very high burden on the
defendant. The defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was
unreasonable under "prevailing professional norms,,,49 while the court is obligated
to "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance.,,5o As the Court stated: "counsel is strongly
presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions
in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.,,51 Furthermore, the appellate
court should not use hindsight to evaluate counsel's performance;52 rather, the
court should give deference to co.unsel's strategic choices. 53 One of the great
pitfalls for defendants who argue ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal is the
strategic choice element. If counsel performed a certain way for strategic purposes,
then the defendant cannot demonstrate ineffective assistance, even when the trial
outcome demonstrated that the strategy was ineffective.54
The burden of the second prong, prejudice, is also hard to overcome and it
brings an additional challenge of ambiguity. To satisfy this prong, the defendant
must prove that counsel's performance caused an unreliable proceeding. 55 The
Court has used two different standards to determine whether a proceeding was
unreliable: (1) whether the proceeding would have had a different result if counsel
had been effective;56 or (2) whether counsel's errors caused a result at trial that
to counsel in habeas corpus proceedings has been created by statute in some jurisdictions.
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849,855 (1994).
47 466 U.S. at 686-87.
48 Id. at 700.
49 Id. at 688.
50 I d. at 689.
51 Id. at 690.
52 I d. at 689.
53 I d. at 690-91.
54 E.g., Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 850 (8th eire 2006) (stating that counsel
had a strategic purpose in failing to object to an improper closing argument, and therefore
counsel's conduct was reasonably professional).
55 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ("The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable,
and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome."). In addition,
"[c]ounsel ... has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a
reliable adversarial testing process." Id. at 688.
56 Id. at 694 (''The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
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cannot be relied on as being juSt. 57 These standards create ambiguity because there
is often a spectrum of justice; differing results can meet the broad standard of
justice. 58 This ambiguity has become significant as the lower courts analyze
whether a defendant has the right to the effective assistance of counsel during the
plea bargaining stage if the defendant pleads not guilty and then receives a
subsequent fair trial with a just but different result than what would have come
from accepting a plea bargain.
Since Strickland, the Court has moved closer toward recognizing plea
bargaining as a "critical stage." In Hill v. Lockhart (Hill), the Supreme Court
expanded the scope of the right to effective assistance to include guilty pleas that
were ascertained through plea bargaining. 59 When applying the Strickland test to
this situation, the Court asked (1) whether counsel preformed deficiently during the
plea bargaining stage; and (2) whether the defendant would have "insisted on
going to trial" absent counsel's errors. 60 The first question is a direct application of
Strickland's first prong. The second question incorporates both the ideas of a
different outcome (a jury trial rather than a plea) and an unreliable outcome
(defendant may have pled guilty when he was actually innocent). This modified
test works to preserve the same constitutional right that the standard Strickland test
preserves: the right to a fair trial. By recognizing certain "critical stages" as well as
the implication of a guilty plea, the Court looks to the impact of these stages on the
defendant's ability to receive a fair trial.
While Hill decided that guilty pleas implicate the right to effective assistance,
the Court has not yet determined whether a not-guilty plea under ineffective
assistance that is followed by a conviction at a fair trial with effective assistance
can be overturned due to counsel's ineffectiveness at plea bargaining. 61 The
chall~nge that lower courts face when confronted with this issue is that not-guilty

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.").
57 Id. at 686 ("The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced ajust result.").
58 Consider, for example, sentencing proceedings. If a defendant receives the strictest
possible sentence within the guidelines, but argues that he could have received a lighter
sentence within the same guidelines if counsel had been effective, then the defendant is
arguing that counsel's performance caused a different result, although the result may still
be considered just.
59 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). It is noteworthy that this opinion contradicted earlier
Supreme Court dicta on the matter: "[a]nd not even now is it suggested that a layman
cannot plead guilty unless he has the opinion of a lawyer on the questions of law that might
arise if he did not admit his guilt." Adams v. United States ex reI. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,
277 (1942).
60 Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
61 Turner v. Tennessee, 664 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1050 (1992).
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pleas maintain a defendant's right to a trial. A defendant who pleads not guilty has
not waived his right to a fair trial. Thus, the question remains: Does he have a
distinct right to a fair plea bargain or at least effective assistance of counsel during
the plea bargaining stage? In simpler terms: Should a convicted defendant receive
a lighter sentence than the law prescribes because of a lost chance at something
better? A competing sense of justice asks: Should not all criminal defendants have
the assistance of competent counsel to guide them through the adversarial plea
bargaining process?
The lower courts are split on the issue. The majority of courts have found that
a defendant has a right to effective counsel during the plea bargaining process,
regardless of whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. All federal circuits and most
states that have decided the issue take this position. 62 However, a few state courts
have held that a defendant is not prejudiced by ineffective counsel at the plea
bargaining stage if he pleads not guilty and then goes on to be convicted at a fair
trial because the defendant has not waived any federal constitutional rights.
Louisiana, Missouri, Tennessee, and Utah constitute this minority position. 63

62 See, e.g., United States v. Herrera, 412 F.3d 577, 580 (5th Cir. 2005); Humphress v.
United States, 2005 FED App. 0094P, 398 F.3d 855, 858 (6th Cir.); United States v.
Rashad, 331 F.3d 908,912 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Tse v. United States, 290 F.3d 462,464 (1st
Cir. 2002); United States v. Brannon, 48 F. App'x 51,53 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Carter, 130 F.3d 1432,
1442 (10th Cir. 1997); Engelen v. United States, 68 F.3d 238, 241 (8th Cir. 1995); Coulter
v. Herring, 60 F.3d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458,
1466 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 45 (3d Cir. 1992); Johnson v.
Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 1986); Avery v. State, Nos. A-4414, A-4691, 1993
WL 13156870, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1993) (mem.); State v. Donald, 10 P.3d
1193,1200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); Rasmussen v. State, 658 S.W.2d 867,868 (Ark. 1983);
In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 755 (Cal. 1992); Cottle v. State, 733 So. 2d 963, 967 (Fla.
1999); Lloyd v. State, 373 S.E.2d 1, 2 (Ga. 1988); People v. Curry, 687 N.E.2d 877, 882
(Ill. 1997); Lyles v. State, 382 N.E.2d 991, 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Kraus, 397
N.W.2d 671, 673 (Iowa 1986); Williams v. State, 605 A.2d 103, 108 (Md. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Mahar, 809 N.E.2d 989, 992 (Mass. 2004); Hodges v. State, 2002-DP
00337-SCT, <j[<j[ 65-66,912 So. 2d 730,763 (Miss. 2005); Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261,
262 (Nev. 1988); State v. Taccetta, 797 A.2d 884, 887 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002);
State v. Simmons, 309 S.E.2d 493,497 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Hicks, No. CA2002
080198, 2003 WL 23095414, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003); Commonwealth v.
Napper, 385 A.2d 521, 524 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Hanzelka v. State, 682 S.W.2d 385, 387
(Tex. Crim. App. 1984); In re Plante, 762 A.2d 873, 876 (Vt. 2000); State V. James, 739
P.2d 1161,1166-67 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); Becton V. Hun, 516 S.E.2d 762,767 (W. Va.
1999); State V. Lentowski, 569 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
63 See, e.g., State V. Monroe, 99-1483, pp. 4-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/22/00), 757 So. 2d
895,898; Bryan V. State, 134 S.W.3d 795,802 (Mo. Ct. App. 2(04); State V. Riley, No. 01
C-019201CRoo040, 1992 WL 300876, at *4-9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 22, 1992); State V.
Geary, 707 P.2d 645,646 (Utah 1985).
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These two theories each rely on different interpretations of the Sixth
Amendment. Does the Amendment provide for an individual right to counsel, or is
that right embedded in the right to a fair trial? Furthermore, if counsel is present
due to the exercise of an established right, does counsel have a duty to be effective
in all forms of representation?

c.

Growth and Status ofPlea Bargaining

Beyond analyzing the basic constitutional right to a fair trial, courts have long
recognized the prevalence of a different form for settling criminal disputes: plea
bargaining. This relatively modem approach to criminal justice, which the
colonists did not envision when drafting the Constitution, has taken a firm place in
our modem system. Now courts are considering whether the plea bargaining
process itself merits the right to effective assistance of counsel outside the right to
a fair trial.
Prior to 1800, the plea-bargaining- process was essentially nonexistent. 64 It
began to appear during the mid-nineteenth century and became institutionalized in
American criminal jurisprudence in the last third of the nineteenth century.65 It
gained significance in the 1920s due to the large number of prohibition cases and
the 1960s with the growth of street crime. 66
Currently, the overwhelming majority of criminal cases in the United States
are disposed of by guilty pleas rather than trialS. 67 In 2002, ninety-five percent of
state-court felony convictions and ninety-six percent of federal convictions were
obtained by guilty pleas. 68 Some factors contributing to the pervasiveness of plea
64 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.1(b), at 6-7 (6th ed. 2004)
(quoting Mark H. Haller, Plea Bargaining: The Nineteenth Century Context, 13 LAW &
Soc'YREv. 273, 273 (1979».
65 I d.
66 I d.
67 Id. § 21.1(a), at 4 (citing Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty
Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 HARV. L. REv. 293, 314 (1975»; Hans Zeisel, The
Disposition of Felony Arrests, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 407, 409-10; Note, Plea
Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. REv. 564, 564
(1977); see also John W. Keker, The Advent of the 'Vanishing Trial': Why Trials Matter,
CHAMPION, September/October 2005, at 32, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/
championarticles/A0509p32.
68 Note, Prejudice and Remedies: Establishing a Comprehensive Framework for
Ineffective Assistance Length-of-Sentence Claims, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2143, 2148 (2006)
(citing MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULL., No. 206916, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2002, at 1
(2004),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/fssc02.pdf (providing
information on state statistics); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
No. 205368, COMPENDIUM OF F'EDERALJUSTICE STATISTICS, 2002, at 58 tbl. 4.2 (2004),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs0204.pdf (providing information on
federal statistics».
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bargaining include crowded court dockets, pretrial detention practices, the poor
quality of some public defenders, financial incentives, the languor of some
prosecutors, a few incompetent judfes, and police and prosecutors who are better
skilled at finding the guilty party. 6 Plea bargaining ,has proven valuable for the
prosecution because it provides a quick and simple means to dispose of a large
quantity of cases. 70
The Supreme Court has recognized the value of plea bargaining,7! but
explained that plea bargaining standing alone does not constitute a constitutional
right: "in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the
judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other
constitutionally protected interest. It is the ensuing guilty plea that implicates the
Constitution." 72 Therefore, while plea bargaining is prevalent and accepted, the
practice does not replace the need for a court's final judgment; nor does an accused
have a constitutional right to a plea bargain. 73 If, therefore, as the Supreme Court
indicates, only the ensuing guilty plea actually implicates the Constitution, then do
failed bargaining efforts lack constitutional significance?

III. DISCUSSION: THE RIFT BETWEEN THE MAJORITY AND THE MINORITY RlTLES
In the modem system of criminal law, the intermingling of plea bargaining
with the right to effective assistance of counsel has caused a small division across
the country. The accused clearly has a constitutional right to counsel, and plea
bargaining is regularly practiced by the prosecution. But the question remains
unsettled whether the accused has a right to the effective assistance of counsel
during the plea-bargaining stage. A minority of jurisdictions recognize that the line
of Supreme Court cases seems to indicate the right to the effective assistance of
counsel is tied with the right to a fair trial.74 Hcrwever, every federal circuit and
most states have extended the right to effective assistance of counsel to include the
plea bargaining stage. 75 Both positions agree the proper method of deciding the
issue is application of the Strickland test. The positions simply disagree on the

69 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 64, § 21.1(b), at 7 (citing Malcolm Feeley, Perspectives
on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 199,200 (1979)).
70 Id. § 21.1 (c), at 8-9 (citing Arnold Inker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REpORT: THE COURTS 108 (1967)).
71 See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,71 (1977); Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257,260 (1971).
72 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984).
73 Id. ("A plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it
is a mere executory agreement whi~h, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not
deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest.").
74 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
75 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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test's results. This section discusses the rationales and application of Strickland
that constitute both the majority and minority positions.
A. Exploring the Majority Position

When applying the first Strickland prong, deficient performance, the courts in
the majority take various approaches to reach the same conclusion: (1) the plea
bargaining stage is a "critical stage" of the proceedings,76 (2) the defined duties of
defense counsel are the same during trial as would be needed during plea
bargaining; furthermore, the duties of counsel are the same whether the defendant
pleads guilty or not guilty during plea bargaining,77 (3) ABA Standards of
Professional Conduct include conduct during plea bargaining,78 and (4) the lack of
counsel at this stage undermines the value of the plea-bargaining process. 79 It is
important to explore each of these arguments in tum to understand the depth and
breadth of the majority analysis.
1. Plea Bargaining Is a "Critical Stage"

Some courts in the majority position have concluded that plea bargaining is a
"critical stage" as defined by United States v. Wade (Wade),80 therefore, the right
to effective counsel is attached. 8! When the Supreme Court decided Wade, the
Court analyzed the Framers' intent behind the right to counsel and concluded that
counsel is necessary not only at trial, but at all "critical stages." The Court noted,
"'the colonists appreciated that if a defendant were forced to stand alone against
the state, his case was foredoomed. ,,,82
Therefore, the Framers intended to broaden the role counsel should play in
assisting her client:
The Framers of the Bill of Rights envisaged a broader role for
counsel than under the practice then prevailing in England of merely
advising his client in "matters of law," and eschewing any responsibility
for "matters of fact." The constitutions in at least 11 of the 13 States
expressly or impliedly abolished this distinction. 83

See infra Part III.A.1.
See infra Part III.A.2.
78 See infra Part III.A.3.
79 See infra Part III.A.4.
80 388 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1967).
81 United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992).
82 Wade, 388 U.S. at 224 (quoting Comment, An Historical Argument for the Right to
Counsel during Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1033-34 (1964)).
83 Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-65 (1932)).
76

77
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In analyzing the Framers' intent, the Supreme Court clearly recognized that
under the modem criminal justice system the need for counsel extends beyond the
need for trial assistance-a defendant needs counsel at other critical stages to
ensure a proper defense: 84

When the Bill of Rights was adopted, there were no organized police
forces as we know them today. The accused confronted the prosecutor
and the witnesses against him, and the evidence was marshalled, largely
at the trial itself. In contrast, today's law enforcement machinery
involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at
pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the accused's fate
and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these
realities of modem criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the
Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to "critical" stages of the
proceedings. 85
Therefore, in order to preserve the trial's integrity as a means of establishing
truth and justice, the Court found that the assistance of counsel is necessary at
other critical stages that directly impact the trial.
Courts that have applied the "critical stage" analysis to the plea-bargaining
process have done so with terse analysis, overlooking the rationale in Wade. 86
However, these courts may not be incorrect to describe plea bargaining as a critical
stage. Plea bargaining certainly involves "critical confrontations,,87 between the
accused and the prosecution. Furthermore, this is a stage in which the defendant
needs to be able to present a proper defense to engage in an effective bargaining
process. "The plain wording of [the Sixth Amendment] guarantee thus
encompasses counsel's assistance whenever necessary to assure a meaningful
'defence.,,,88 The reasoning in Wade may then, under a certain interpretation,
support the extension of the right to counsel to include the plea bargaining process.
2. Counsel's Duties Are the Same Regardless ofDefendant's Plea

When looking at counsel's duties, other majority courts reason that the
extension of the right to counsel is reasonable because counsel's duties in the plea
bargaining stage are no different from her duties at trial.89 Strickland defined
defense counsel's "overarching duty" as "advocat[ing] the defendant's
cause ... consult[ing] with the defendant on important decisions and ... keep[ing]

84

85

I d. at 224-25.
I d. at 224 (citations omitted).

See, e.g., State v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671, 673 (Iowa 1986).
Wade, 388 U.S. at 224.
88 I d. at 225.
89 See, e.g., In re Alvemaz, 830 P.2d 747, 753-54 (1992).
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the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the
prosecution.,,9o A violation of these duties resulting in defendant entering a
voluntary guilty plea may constitute ineffective assistance of counse1. 91
The duties of defense counsel during plea bargaining are the same whether the
assistance results in defendant pleading guilty or not guilty.92 Therefore, the rights
of a defendant regarding that advice should also be the same, regardless of how the
defendant decides to plea. 93
3. ABA Standards of Professional Conduct Include Conduct during Plea
Bargaining
Some majority courts have considered the implication of ABA standards, as
referenced in Strickland,94 to find a basis for extending the right to effective
assistance to plea bargaining. 95 ABA standards state that "[d]efense counsel should
conclude a plea agreement only with the consent of the defendant, and should
ensure that the decision whether to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is
ultimately made by the defendant,,96 and "[d]efense counsel should promptly
communicate and explain to the accused all significant plea proposals made by the
prosecutor.,,97 These standards clearly indicate that counsel has specific duties in
the plea-bargaining stage. When duties are prescribed, then the failure to comply
with those duties can reasonably be described as ineffective assistance.
4. The Right Is Necessary to Sustain the Integrity of Plea Bargaining

Finally, some courts have looked at the integrity of the plea bargaining
process. By rejecting the right to counsel when a defendant pleads not guilty in the
plea bargaining stage, a court "would seriously undermine the functioning of the
plea negotiation process" because the court would create an imbalance between the

90

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,688 (1984); see also Alvernaz, 830 P.2d at

754.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,58-59 (1985).
See United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 380 (2d Cir. 1998) ("By grossly
underestimating [the defendant's] sentencing exposure . . . [counsel] breached his duty . . .
to advise his client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears desirable."
(citations omitted)).
93 See United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992).
94 466 U.S. at 688 (noting that ABA standards "are guides to determining what is [a]
reasonable" standard of representation when determining the merits of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim).
95 See, e.g., United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1466 (9th Cir. 1994).
96 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-3.2(c) (2d. ed. 1986); see also
Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1466.
97 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-6.2(b) (3d ed. 1993).
91

92
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weight of pleading guilty and the weight of going to trial. 98 Not only could harms
resulting from a guilty plea be redressed on appeal, but also counsel's performance
would likely be more effective in the plea process because such performance
would be subject to the scrutiny of the Strickland standards for ineffective
assistance. The decision to go to trial, however, would lack such benefits; the
decision itself could not be appealed, and the attorney assisting to make the
decision has little reason to afford reasonable assistance at that stage.
These four approaches constitute differing attempts to satisfy the first
Strickland prong-deficient performance. They demonstrate how counsel's
performance can fall "below an objective standard of reasonableness.,,99 The first
three approaches (critical stage, consistent duties, and ABA standards) explain that
there is a standard for counsel's performance at the plea bargaining stage and they
explain why the defendant is in need of assistance at this stage. The final approach
(integrity of plea bargaining), demonstrates why the right is necessary to preserve a
fair criminal justice system.
The majority position finds that a defendant meets the second prong of the
Strickland test, prejudice, by showing that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the plea negotiations
would have been different; i.e., defendant would have pled guilty and forfeited his
right to a tria1. 1OO Also, defendant must show that he was deprived of the
10l
opportunity to exchange a guilty plea for a lesser sentence. Upon showing these
two points, the defendant has sufficiently proven prejudice-that the proceeding
produced a different result. 102
The rationale behind this position is explained as the majority courts attempt
to counter the minority argument. The majority position utilizes basically two
different approaches: (1) the defendant needs adequate information regarding the
consequences before he can make a sound decision regarding a plea offer, and (2)
the result of an error during the plea bargaining stage can be significant, regardless
of how the defendant pleads.
The majority contends that even though the defendant may have received a
fair trial, he is still prejudiced by a much longer sentence than the plea offered. 103
Some courts in the majority position clearly recognize "that a criminal defendant
has no constitutional right to a plea bargain,,,l04 but they still conclude that "once
the State engages in plea bargaining, the defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to
be adequately informed of the consequences before deciding whether to accept or

In re Alvemaz, 830 P.2d 747, 754 (Cal. 1992).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
100 See Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1466-67.
101 United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1992).
102 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (referencing Strickland's definition
of prejudice).
103 Id.
104 State v. Donald, 10 P.3d 1193, 1200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
98

99
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reject the offer"I05 because the "alternate decisions-to plead guilty or instead
proceed to trial-are products of the same attorney-client interaction and involve
the same professional obligations of counsel.,,106
Other courts recognize the distinction between a guilty plea and a not-guilty
plea followed by a fair trial and state that "the validity of a guilty plea is different
from the validity of the plea process where an accused pleads not guilty."I07
However, '~the test for ineffective assistance of counsel should be the same"
because "the result of an error at this critical stage of the proceedings can have as
serious an effect on the defendant who pleads not guilty as on the defendant who
pleads guilty."I08
These explanations satisfy the personal sense of fairness and rightness that the
lay person searches for when confronted with this issue. But do they actually
comply with the United States Constitution? Can we reasonably say that the
following circumstances are the same: (1) a defendant ignorantly pleads guilty
without exercising his right to a trial and then desires the opportunity to be tried by
a jury, and (2) a defendant exercises his right to a trial, is found guilty by his peers,
and then desires a lighter sentence than resulted from his trial because he missed an
opportunity to effectively plea bargain?
B. Exploring the Minority Position
The minority position relies strongly on (1) the connection between the right
to the assistance of counsel and the right to a fair trial, but the position also looks
to (2) contract law, (3) the finality principle, and (4) the remedy problems to reason
that the extension of the right to effective counsel in this context is inappropriate.
As with the majority analysis, it is important to explore each of these arguments in
tum to understand the depth and breadth of the minority analysis.
1. Not-Guilty Pleas Do Not Implicate the Right to a Fair Trial

Recognizing the Supreme Court's holding in Hill v. Lockhart,109 the minority
position distinguishes guilty pleas from not-guilty pleas based on their connection
to a fair trial. While a guilty plea "deprive[s] the defendant of numerous legal
protections, including the right to a trial, the presumption of innocence, the right to
confront his accusers, and the right to appeal," a not-guilty plea has no such

105

I d.

In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 753 (Cal. 1992).
State v. James, 739 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
108 d.
I
109 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985) (holding that guilty pleas implicate the
right to effective assistance of counsel).
106

107
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implications.110 Therefore, a guilty plea merits the right to effective assistance of
counsel while a not-guilty plea does not.
Furthermore, this position contends that clearly there is no constitutional right
to a plea bargain.111 Thus~ the .defendant is not prejudiced by counsel's deficient
performance because the defendant "preserved all of his constitutional rights
including his only chance of being found not guilty."112 As one court stated: "The
error as to potential sentencing ha[s] no effect on the evidence at trial, no bearing
on [defendant's] guilt or innocence."113 This argument relies strongly on the
following Strickland language: "the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and
is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.,,114 In the absence
of a right to a plea bargain, a not-guilty plea maintains all of the defendant's
constitutional rights. Therefore, defendant does not need the assistance of counsel
to preserve his constitutional rights.

2. Plea Bargains Are Akin to Contracts
Louisiana compares a plea bargain to a contract. "A party to a contract may
obtain a vested interest in its enforcement, but a party who has rejected a contract
has no such vested interest.,,115 Furthermore, the prosecutor is always in a position
to withdraw his offer, even after the defendant accepts it, providing that a final
judgment has not been entered. 116 Therefore, a defendant should not be able to
request the COUlt to reinstate an offer that was at the prosecutor's discretion.
Furthermore, "[w]hatever potential costs, risks, and consequences caused the
prosecution to tender its plea offer ... the defendant's rejection of that offer has
caused the prosecution to incur the very costs, risks, and consequences that the
prosecution hoped to avoid.,,117 It is unbalanced to give the defendant the benefits
he would have received if he had entered into the contract, but deprive the
prosecution of the benefits it would have enjoyed had the contract been accepted.

State v. Monroe, 99-1483, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/22/00), 757 So. 2d 895, 898.
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977); see also Monroe, 99-1483, p. 5
n.1, 757 So. 2d at 898 n.1; State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913,919 n.7 (Utah 1987); State v.
Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985).
112 Monroe, 99-1483, p. 4,757 So. 2d at 898.
113 Id.; see also Geary, 707 P.2d at 646-47.
114 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984); see also Bryan v. State, 134
S.W.3d 795,802 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
115 Monroe, 99-1483, p. 5, 757 So. 2d at 898.
116 See United States v. Papaleo, 853 F.2d 16, 18-20 (1st Cir. 1988); Commonwealth
v. Mahar, 809 N.E.2d 989, 1001 (Mass. 2004) (Sosman, J., concurring).
117 Mahar, 809 N.E.2d at 1001-02.
110
111
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3. Finality Demands that Errorless Jury Verdicts Not Be Overturned

Some minority courts recognize that inherent in the minority position is
justice's demand for finality: "Every inroad on" the concept of finality undermines
confidence in the integrity of our procedures; and, by increasing the volume of
judicial work, inevitably delays and impairs the orderly administration of
justice."u8 These courts reason that overturning a jury conviction due to
ineffective assistance during plea bargaining undermines the finality principle.
The Supreme Court recognized the need for finality in Hill but reasoned that
the circumstances warranted an exception. The issue of ineffective assistance "is
only rarely raised by a petition to set aside a guilty plea,,,u9 the Court explained.
However, the minority position reasons that the circumstances of not-guilty pleas
are different. A fair trial has produced a reliable final judgment. Stepping in to alter
that judgment would infringe on the confidence and integrity of our judicial
proceedings. Unlike guilty pleas that circumvent a trial, not-guilty pleas implicate
a trial. Therefore, the minority courts look to the standard of review for
overturning a jury verdict when the defendant claims ineffectiv~ssistance at trial:
"whether the petitioner was afforded a fair trial.,,120 This standard does not look at
proceedings prior to the trial that did not directly impact the trial.
4. The Majority Position Has Failed to Identify an Appropriate Remedy

The final problem the minority position confronts is identifying an
appropriate remedy.121 The majority courts that have dealt with this aspect of the
issue generally take one of two approaches: grant the defendant a new trial 122 or
require the prosecution to reinstate the originally rejected plea offer. 123 Neither
approach is appropriate, according to the minority.
The minority position argues that a new trial on its face hardly seems like a
viable remedy because the defendant has already been convicted at a fair trial.
What benefit will one more fair trial really have? In reality, "a new trial is granted
as a not-so-subtle means of pressuring the prosecution into putting the prior deal
back on the table.,,124 However, evidence may have changed either to the benefit of
the prosecution or the defense, making one side unwilling to make a plea deal.
118 United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (quoting United States v.
Smith, 440 F.2d 521,528-29 (1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
119 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
120 Rasmussen v. State, 658 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ark. 1983) (Adkisson, C.J., dissenting).
121 See, e.g., Bryan v. State, 134 S.W.3d 795,804 (Mo. Ct. App. 2(04).
122 See Hanzelka v. State, 682 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. et. App. 1984); State v.
Ludwig, 369 N.W.2d 722,728 (Wis. 1985).
123 E.g., Satterlee v. Wolfenbarger, 2006 FED App. 0218P, 453 F.3d 362, 364 (6th
Cir.).
124 Commonwealth v. Mahar, 809 N.E.2d 989, 1002 (Mass. 2004) (referencing In re
Alvemaz, 830 P.2d 747 (Cal. 1992); Lyles v. State, 382 N.E.2d 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978)).
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Then it appears that the defendant gets a second shot at proving his innocence even
though a jury at a fair trial has akeady found him guilty. Or a prosecutor,
acknowledging the previous conviction, may refuse to make another plea offer
because the prosecutor is" ·confident they can get another conviction. Thus the
issuance of a new trial has the significant potential of granting no real remedy at
all.125
The second remedy approach is equally unappealing, according to the
minority. Requiring the prosecution to reinstate the original plea offer conflicts
with the established balance ~f power between the parties and the court126 and
"would be inconsistent with the legitimate exercise of the prosecutorial discretion
involved in the negotiation.,,127 Furthermore, this remedy extracts the court's role
in rejecting or accepting a plea bargain when the offer is presented to the court by
the two parties. 128 Thus, an appropriate remedy has not yet been obtained, even if a
right can be found.
IV. PREDICTIONS: POSSIBILITY OF SUPREME COURT INTERVENTION AND LIKELY
RESULT

A. Likelihood ofSupreme Court Intervention
Certiorari petitions have been filed to the Supreme Court numerous times in
hopes of reaching a consensus on this issue. 129 However, the Court has repeatedly
declined to review the issue. Recent developments may soon change this trend.
Previously, the certiorari petitions to the Supreme Court have been from
prosecutors in opposition to the majority position. 13o The Court likely did not give
these petitions significant attention because the majority position nearly constitutes
a consensus; the Court likely did not see a need to explore an issue that is nearly
unanimously resolved without their assistance. However, the Utah Supreme Court,
which has taken the minority position, has granted certiorari on the case discussed

125 See Turner v. Tennessee, 664 F. Supp 1113, 1126 (M.D. Tenn. 1987) ("[W]hen
ineffective assistance of counsel results in the lost chance to accept a favorable plea
bargain, simply remanding for a new trial is meaningless.").
126 Mahar, 809 N.E.2d at 1001....()2.
127 In re Alvemaz, 830 P.2d at 759.
128 Id. (stating that "the remedy of specific enforcement of the plea offer" is
inconsistent "with the exercise of the trial court's broad discretion in determining the
appropriate sentence for a defendant's criminal conduct").
129 A partial list of cases denied certiorari includes Hodges v. Mississippi, 126 S. Ct.
739 (2005); Humphress v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 199 (2005); Arizona v. Donald, 534
U.S. 825 (2001); McGinnis v. Mask, 534 U.S. 943 (2001); Baker v. Barbo, 528 U.S.
911 (1999); Carter v. United States, 523 U.S. 1144 (1998); and Hiatt v. Indiana State
Student Assistance Commission, 513 U.S. 1154 (1995).
130 See cases cited supra note 129.
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in the introduction to this Note, State v. Grueber,131 which could eventually
persuade the United States Supreme Court to'explore and decide this issue.
At issue in Grueber is whether the defendant was denied effective assistance
of counsel prior to trial when counsel failed to fully investigate the prosecution's
position,132 undermining the defense's strategy. The defendant rejected a plea offer
that he claims he would have accepted had his counsel performed a thorough
investigation. 133 The Utah Court of Appeals easily decided the issue based on Utah
precedent: Defendants are '''guarantee[d] fair trials, not plea bargains."'134
Therefore, defendant was not prejudiced. 135
Presuming that the Utah Supreme Court will continue to follow Utah
precedent, the defendant will have a strong petition to bring to the United States
Supreme Court. Considering the large majority of courts that have decided this
issue differently, the United States Supreme Court may be interested to review the
rationale behind Utah's precedent.
B. Predicting the Supreme Court's Ruling

Predicting the Court's ruling is difficult because there is precedential weight
on both sides of the issue. Supporting the minority position, a recently decided
Supreme Court case involved the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the context
of a defendant's right to choose his counsel. 136 The Court held that "[d]eprivation
is 'complete' when the defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented
by the lawyer he wants, regardless of the quality of the representation he
received.,,137 Analyzing the right to counsel, the Court recognized the distinction
between the right to effective assistance of counsel and the right to choose one's
counsel. Specifically, the Court reasoned that the right to effective representation is
133 P.3d 437 (Utah 2006).
An interesting sub-issue relates to what constitutes an effective investigation and
whether pretrial investigation is really a fact to determine the effectiveness of counsel. See
Bernhard, supra note 13, at 236 (discussing a study in Maricopa County, Arizona, which
includes Phoenix, that revealed only 55% of public defenders visited the crime scene
before the final felony trial, only 31 % interviewed all of the prosecution's witnesses, 15%
admitted to interviewing none of the prosecution's witnesses, and an overwhelming 30%
entered plea agreements without interviewing any defense witnesses).
To locate the Arizona study, see Marty Lieberman, Investigation of Facts in
Preparation for Plea Bargaining, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 557, 576, 579; and Margaret L.
Steiner, Adequacy of Fact Investigation in Criminal Defense Lawyers' Trial Preparation,
1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 523, 534--38.
133 State v. Grueber, 2005 UT App 480U.
134Id. (quoting State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645,646 (Utah 1985)); see also ide (citing
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993); and State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 n.7
(Utah 1987)).
135 Grueber, 2005 UT App 480U.
136 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2561 (2006).
137 Id. at 2563.
131

132
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derived from the right to a fair trial while the right to choose one's counsel is a
right independent of the right to a fair trial. 138 Of significance to the issue under
discussion is the acknowledgement that the Supreme Court continues to view the
right to effective assistance as a right tied to a fair trial. The majority position had
disregarded this connection when it analyzed the right to counsel in relation to plea
bargaining. Therefore, Gonzalez-Lopez seems to favor the minority position.
However, two distinct approaches remain to justify the extension of the right
to effective assistance during plea bargaining. The first approach looks at the
invocation of the right to counsel at a stage prior to plea bargaining. The second
approach looks at the intention behind the Sixth Amendment to reason that the
Framers would have preserved such a right had plea bargaining been a colonial
method of resolving criminal disputes. These approaches can sufficiently address
the first Strickland prong, but the second, prejudice, must be handled differently.
The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that "the right to counsel is the right
to the effective assistance of counsel.,,139 The "Sixth Amendment right to counsel
is triggered 'at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated ...
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment.,,,14o Plea bargaining that takes place after the right to counsel has
been invoked involves the assistance of counsel, whether or not plea bargaining
itself invokes the right. Therefore, if counsel is present and assisting, then counsel
should surely be effective, otherwise counsel may be more of a hindrance than an
aid. For example, if counsel renders significantly bad advice, misinforms the
defendant of the sentencing guidelines, or fails to inform defendant of a plea offer,
the defendant is in a worse position than if he were acting without the counsel's
assistance. Counsel's "principal responsibility is to serve the undivided interests of
his client.,,141 As the Court noted, "'defense counsel who is appointed by the court
... has exactly the same duties and burdens and responsibilities as the highly paid,
paid-in-advance criminal defense lawyer.",142 Therefore, when a client is
represented by counsel whose performance falls "below an objective standard of
reasonableness,,143 then that client has been subjected to ineffective assistance of
counsel.
The Court can parse the right to counsel from the right to the effective
assistance of counsel by reasoning that when counsel is representing a client due to
a right previously invoked, then that counsel has a duty to be effective in her
complete representation of her client, r~gardless of her client's right to counsel
regarding a later stage at which counsel must participate because of a previously
138

I d.

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,771 n.14 (1970).
Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 523 (2004) (quoting Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977)).
141 Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193,204 (1979).
142 Id. at 200 n.17 (quoting Warren E. Burger, Counsel for the Prosecution and
Defense-Their Roles under the Minimum Standards, 8 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 2, 6 (1969)).
143 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
139
140
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invoked constitutional right. In other words, if counsel is present, then counsel
must be effective.
The second approach, justifying the right to effective counsel at plea
bargaining, best fits with the original intention behind the Sixth Amendment, to
ensure the average defendant has the professional legal skills to balance the skill
and training of the prosecution. 144 As the practice of plea bargaining has gained
prominence, surely the Supreme Court will recognize that effective counsel is
necessary for a lay defendant in the adversarial process.
Beyond these rationales, parsing the right to counsel and recognizing the
Framers' intent, lingers the question of prejudice. The prosecution may argue that a
defendant cannot be prejudiced when he receives a fair trial and a subsequent fair
sentence, as guided by law. Furthermore, a defendant's inability to take advantage
of a windfall regarding sentencing is not sufficient prejudice because he did not
have a right to less than the law prescribes. In other words, a person who intended
to enter the lottery and already chose the numbers for his ticket has no remedy
when he fails to enter, even though his chosen numbers constitute the winning
ticket. He is certainly deserving of some sympathy; but society would not demand
that he receive any of the prize money. Likewise, a defendant who is able to make
a good deal and thereby save the prosecution the time and expense of a trial is
fortunate because he receives a lighter sentence. However, that lighter sentence is
not a right nor even a privilege he can claim after the trial is over.
This approach can be countered in three ways: (1) understanding that "the
lottery" is being played by both the defendant and the prosecution, (2) considering
the legal principle of agency, and (3) recognizing that the test for prejudice asks
whether the result absent counsel's errors would have been different, not whether
the result would have been fair.
Plea bargaining is just that, a bargain. Both sides play a game of sorts in
which they attempt to get the best deal. A prosecutor with a weak case may offer a
light sentence knowing the odds are slim that he would actually prevail at trial.
Likewise, a defendant who is afraid of the greater sentence at trial may be willing
to plead guilty for a lighter sentence. The process only approaches fairness when
both sides know how to participate. A lay defendant needs the assistance of
experienced and educated counsel to teach him the rules. Otherwise, he may
believe the prosecution has a strong case when it does not, or he may miscalculate
his chances of winning at trial.
Furthermore, counsel, as defendant's agent, has a duty to advocate for and
represent the defendant as though she were representing herself. 145 Her failure to
perform her role as defendant's agent prevents defendant from adequately
engaging in the overwhelmingly prevalent process of plea bargaining, in which

144
145

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
1 (1958).
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defendant has an opportunity to receive a sentence much lighter than a judge may
later give him for the same crime. 146
Of even greater significance is the defined test for prejudice: but for counsel's
errors the result would have been different. 147 Results based on sentencing, rather
than guilt or innocence, have constituted such a difference. 148 Indeed, the Court has
found prejudice based on counsel's performance during sentencing-after the
defendant has been found guilty. 149 The circumstances surrounding the issue under
discussion are analogous. A defendant is not contesting his conviction; rather, he is
contesting his sentence due to his counsel's failure to adequately represent him
during the plea-bargaining process. Whether the sentence is determined before a
plea is entered or after conviction is irrelevant on this matter-the effective
assistance of counsel is needed at both stages to ensure that the defendant's
sentence is appropriate. Otherwise, the defendant is prejudiced by an unnecessarily
longer sentence.
Therefore, the rationale tends to indicate the Supreme Court will find that a
defendant is entitled to effective representation when counsel is present;
furthermore, when counsel's error causes the defendant to receive a longer
sentence, then the defendant has been prejudiced.

v.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the event the Supreme Court rules that the right to effective assistance of
counsel does not extend to the plea bargaining stage, Congress and individual state
legislatures can and should invest this right in criminal defendants, as has been
done for post-conviction proceedings. 15o Certainly, the need for equality between
defendants of varying economic brackets begs action to be taken for indigent
defendants, who are more likely to receive ineffective assistance during plea
bargaining. Indigent defendants should receive the same opportunities at a plea
bargain as wealthier defendants who are more inclined to hire competent counsel
who will work effectively and vigorously at all stages of the proceedings on their
client's behalf.
As a normative matter, a defendant clearly needs the right to effective
assistance for the plea-bargaining process to be fair. When ninety-five percent of
felony convictions in state courts result in plea bargaining, 151 leaders and
administrators should recognize this process needs to be regulated in a way that

146 STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302, at 40-41, 83 (2005) (noting that judges give
stricter sentences to defendants who choose to go to trial, a concept known as "trial tax").
147 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
148 Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198,203 (2001) ("[Olur jurisprudence suggests
that any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance.").
149 Id. at 200, 203-04.
150 See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(2) (2006).
151 Note, Prejudice and Remedies, supra note 68, at 2148 (internal citation omitted).
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preserves our constitutional objective of fairness. 152 Our criminal justice system
has evolved since the writing of the Constitution; 153 the ideals behind the
constitution need to remain constant in this changing system. Fairness through
legal competence should exist not only when a case goes to trial, but at all stages
of interaction between the defendant and the prosecution. Only then can we
proclaim to protect the rights of the accused.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has found that the Sixth Amendment guarantee to the
assistance of counsel not only means the effective assistance of counsel during
trial, but also extends to critical stages of the prosecution that have the potential of
negating the right to a fair trial. The right to counsel has been found to attach as
early in the process as the arraignment. However, the right has not been explicitly
attached to the plea bargaining stage when a defendant rejects a plea bargain, even
though the defendant's counsel is a participant in the process due to the
defendant's earlier exercise of his right to council.
The Supreme Court may soon decide that this right is constitutional.
However, failure to do so does not negate the possibility of defendants acquiring
this right by other means. Congress and individual state legislatures can establish
this right by statute, thereby enabling all defendants the opportunity to be
effectively represented in the plea bargaining stage, regardless of the defendant's
inability to hire his own counsel.

152
153

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) ("When the Bill of Rights

was adopted, there were no organized police forces as we know them today. The accused
confronted the prosecutor and the witnesses against him, and the evidence was marshalled,
largely at the trial itself. In contrast, today's law enforcement machinery involves critical
confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings.").

AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN PROGENY:
TAKING NGUYEN v. INS A STEP BEYOND THE COURT OPINION
RAYMINH NGO*
I. INTRODucTION
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Nguyen v. INS! that section
309 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA,,)2 did not violate the equal
protection guarantee embedded in the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Section 309 governs the acquisition of United States citizenship by a
child born abroad to unwed parents, one of whom is a United States citizen and the
other a foreign nationa1. 3 However, section 309 imposes different requirements for
the child's acquisition of her parent's citizenship depending on whether the citizen
parent is the mother or the father. 4
Under section 309, if the child's United States citizen parent is the mother, the
child automatically acquires her mother's citizenship at birth, provided at the time
of the child's birth the mother was a United States national who had been residing
in the United States for at least one year. 5 On the other hand, if the child's United
States citizen parent is the father, four conditions, above and beyond what are
required of citizen mothers, must be met.
First, a blood relationship between the father and the child must be established
by "clear and convincing evidence.,,6 Second, the father must have been a United
States national at the time of the child's birth. 7 Tlrird, unless he is deceased, the
father agrees in writing to provide financial support for the child while the child is

* Senior Staff Member, Utah Law Review.
1
2

533 U.S. 53 (2001).
8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2006).

I d.
I d.
5 Id. § 1409(c). Although "all U.S. citizens are by definition U.S. nationals, not all

3

4

U.S. nationals are U.S. citizens. A U.S. national is defined in the INA as either a U.S.
citizen or 'a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent
allegiance to the United States. '" David A. Isaacson, Correcting Anomalies in the United
States Law oJ Citizenship by Descent, 47 ARIZ. L. REv. 313, 359 (2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(22)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1408. With a few exceptions, United States nationals
currently "have most of the rights of [U.S.] citizens, and cannot be excluded or deported
from the United States." Isaacson, supra, at 360. However, the terms are often used
interchangeably because the statutory distinction between "nationality" and "citizenship"
"has little practical impact today," and because there are few United States nationals who
are not also United States citizens. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 467 n.2 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1).
7Id. § 1409(a)(2).
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under age eighteen. 8 Finally, one of three things must be satisfied while the child is
under age eighteen: (1) the child is legitimated under the law of her residence or
domicile,9 (2) the father acknowledges paternity of the child in writing and under
oath/o or (3) the child's paternity is established by adjudication of a competent
court. 11

A. The Facts in Nguyen
Tuan Anh Nguyen ("Nguyen") was born in Saigon,I2 Vietnam, in September
1969. 13 Nguyen's father, Joseph Boulais ("Boulais"), was an American citizen who
never married Nguyen's mother, a Vietnamese national. I4 Boulais was an ex
soldier who was working for a military contractor at the time Nguyen was born. I5
Nguyen's mother abandoned him shortly after her relationship with Boulais ended;
baby Nguyen then lived with the family of Boulais's new Vietnamese girlfriend. I6
Nguyen was separated from his father during the fall of Saigon in 1975, and
he was forced to flee to the United States with his grandmother on a refugee ship.I7
He was soon after paroled into the United States as a refugee. I8 In Florida, Nguyen,
who was almost six, was reunited with Boulais, who returned to Texas to raise
Nguyen. I9 Nguyen thereafter became a permanent resident alien of the United
States. 20
In 1992, at age twenty-two, Nguyen pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual
assault on a child, and was sentenced to eight years in prison for each count.21
Because he was an alien who had committed two "crimes involving moral
turpitude" on top of an aggravated felony, the Immigration and Naturalization

I d. § 1409(a)(3).
I d. § 1409(a)(4)(A).
10 I d. § 1409(a)(4)(B).
11 Id. § 1409(a)(4)(C).

8
9

12 Saigon, the former capitol of South Vietnam, officially became Ho Chi Minh City,
the current capitol of Vietnam, when North Communist forces defeated and took over
South Vietnam in 1975. Wendy N. Duong, Gender Equality and Women's Issues in
Vietnam: The Vietnamese Woman-Warrior and Poet, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL'y J. 191,222
(2001).
13 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 57 (2001).
14

I d.

15 Brief of Petitioners at 4, Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (No. 99-2071), 2000 WL 1706737;
Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing
Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271, 1280 (2005).
16 Dowd, supra note 15, at 1280; Isaacson, supra note 5, at 329.
17 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 15, at 4; Dowd, supra note 15, at 1280.
18 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 15, at 4; Dowd, supra note 15, at 1280.
19 Dowd, supra note 15, at 1280.
20 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
21

I d.
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Service ("INS,,)22 initiated deportation proceedings against him three years later. 23
Although Boulais had provided financial support for Nguyen throughout Nguyen's
minority years, he had neglected to establish his paternity prior to Nguyen's
eighteenth birthday.24 Therefore, under INS regulations, Nguyen was an alien
eligible for deportation.
In 1998, while Nguyen's deportation was pending, a Texas state court
determined Boulais's paternity based on DNA testing, confirming his biological
relationship with Nguyen. 25 Nevertheless, both the Board of Immigration Appeals
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Nguyen was not entitled to
citizenship because his father had failed to comply with the requirements of section
309 in a timely manner. 26 The Fifth Circuit also rejected the argument that section
309 violated equal protection by imposing different requirements on United States
citizen parents on the basis of their gender.27 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 28
B. The Holding in Nguyen

The Supreme Court first acknowledged that the first two requirements of
section 309(a), subsections (1) and (2), were satisfied. 29 The Court also held that
the third requirement, subsection 309(a)(3), did not apply to Nguyen because it had
been added in 1986, after his birth?O However, the Court held that the fourth
requirement, subsection 309(a)(4), was not satisfied. 3! Nguyen was therefore
ineligible for citizenship under section 309. 32

22 Shortly after September 11, 2001, jurisdiction over the INS was transferred from
the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security; further, the INS was
divided into three new agencies, one of which was the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Service ("USCIS"), which now has jurisdiction over immigration benefits
including residency and naturalization applications. See MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN
DEFENDANTS 6-7 (2003); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigration
Services and Benefits, http://www.uscis.gov (follow "Services & Benefits" hyperlink) (last
visited Dec. 22, 2006). For purposes of this discussion, "INS" is used instead of "USCIS."
23 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57; see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
24 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 15, at 5.
25 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
26 [d. at 57-58.
27 [d. at 58.
28 Nguyen v. INS, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000).
29 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(I)-(2) (2006).
30 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 60; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(3).
31 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 60. The Court stated that all parties in the litigation agreed the
affirmative requirements of subsection 309(a)(4) were not satisfied. [d.
32 [d.
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Having determined that Nguyen was ineligible for citizenship, the Court
considered whether section 309' s gender-based distinction was constitutional.
Following its equal protection jurisprudence, the Court applied heightened
scrutiny. Therefore, the question was whether the "classification serve[d] . . .
important governmental objectives [and whether] the discriminatory means
employed [were] substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.,,33
The Court held that section 309 satisfied that standard. 34
Although the Court acknowledged that section 309 imposed unequal
conditions on fathers and mothers, it reasoned that Congress had legitimate reasons
for the gender-based distinction. Specifically, the Court identified two important
government objectives behind the distinction?5 The first was the "importance of
assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists.,,36
In the case of the mother, the Court reasoned that a biological parent-child
relationship is verifiable from birth: the mother is always present at her child's
birth, and her status is documented, in most instances, by the birth certificate or
hospital records and witnesses who attest to her having given birth. 37 The father, on
the other hand, need not be present at his child's birth. 38 Even if he is present, "that
circumstance is not incontrovertible proof of fatherhood.,,39 In short, because the
mother's biological relationship to the child is verifiable at birth whereas the
father's is not, this justifies imposing additional burdens on the father to establish
his biological relationship with the child.
The second important government objective was Congress's desire to:
[E]nsure that the child and the citizen parent have some demonstrated
opportunity or potential to develop not just a relationship that is
recognized, as a formal matter, by the law, but one that consists of the
real, everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen
parent and, in tum, the United States. 40
Here, the Court reasoned that because the mother is always present at her child's
birth, it necessarily follows that she will always have an "initial point of contact"

Id. at 60-61 (citations omitted).
Id. at 71. The Court was confronted with a constitutional challenge against section
309 in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998). However, as noted in Nguyen, because of
the highly fragmented nature of that decision the constitutional issue was not resolved.
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 58.
35 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
33

34

36

I d.

Id.
I d.
39 Id. (citations omitted).
4° I d. at 64-65 (citation omitted).
37

38
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with the child.41 Therefore, there is at least an "opportunity" for a meaningful
parent-child relationship to develop beyond the biological one. 42
However, in the case of the unwed father, because of the nine-month interval
between conception and birth, it is not certain that he would know "that a child was
conceived, nor is it always clear that even the mother will be sure of the father's
identity.,,43 This fact is exacerbated where the child was born abroad and out of
wedlock. The concern here, said the Court, "has always been with young people,
men for the most part, who are on duty with the Armed Forces in foreign
countries.,,44 Without an initial point of contact with the child, there is no guarantee
the father and the child will have an opportunity to develop a meaningful parent
child relationship beyond the purely biological one. 45 For this reason, Congress
was justified in imposing on fathers the affirmative requirements of section 309(a).
Having held that section 309 survived heightened scrutiny and was therefore
constitutional, the Court applied the statute to the facts of the case. Although
Boulais had established his biological relationship with Nguyen to a 99.98%
certainty through a DNA test,46 the Court found the test was insufficient for
purposes of section 309. 47 Specifically, because the affirmative requirements of
subsection 309(a)(4) were not satisfied in time, Nguyen was not eligible for
citizenship as a child born out of wedlock to a United States citizen. 48 The Court so
held despite not only DNA evidence of Boulais's biological relationship with
Id. at 66.
Id.
43 Id. at 65.
44 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
45 Id. at 66.
46 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 15, at 7.
47 The Court specifically rejected Nguyen's argument that DNA evidence of paternity
should be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 309 because the sophistication of
modern DNA tests serves the requirement of subsection 309(1), which requires only "clear
and convincing evidence" of blood paternity. Nguyen, 533 u.s. at 63 (citations omitted). In
other words, Nguyen argued that satisfaction of subsection 309(1) should be sufficient for
purposes of establishing paternity and, therefore, section 309. Id. In rejecting that
argument, the Court reasoned that the
41

42

Constitution . . . does not require that Congress elect one particular mechanism
from among many possible methods of establishing paternity, even if that
mechanism arguably might be the most scientifically advanced method. With
respect to DNA testing, the expense, reliability, and availability of such testing
in various parts of the world may have been of particular concern to Congress.
Id. (citation omitted). Further, the Court reasoned that "[t]he importance of the
governmental interest at issue here is too profound to be satisfied merely by conducting a
DNA test ... scientific proof of biological paternity does nothing, by itself, to ensure
contact between father and child during the child's minority." Id. at 67.
48 Id. at 60.
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Nguyen, but also evidence that Boulais had raised Nguyen in the United States
since Nguyen was six and that Nguyen's mother had long abandoned him. 49
Ultimately, the Court's holding could be described as one that was driven by legal
technicalities rather than reality. 50

C. A Step beyond the Court Opinion
What is troubling about Nguyen, aside from the fact that the Court paid only
lip service to the "heightened scrutiny" it purported to apply, is that the Court
analyzed the issue and pronounced its holding primarily within the framework of
gender discrimination or equal protection. 51 Hence, much of the legal scholarship
commenting on this case has, following the Court's lead, analyzed Nguyen in terms
of its implications on gender equality, the rights of fathers, or equal protection
generally. In other words, scholarship has largely focused on the impact of Nguyen
on citizen parents. 52 However, this strictly citizen-parent-centered approach
ignores the class of persons most affected by the decision: non-citizen children. In

Dowd, supra note 15, at 1280; Isaacson, supra note 5, at 329.
"Reality" here refers not only to the reality that Nguyen had a meaningful parent
child relationship with his father (which was clearly stronger than the almost nonexistent
relationship he shared with his mother) beyond his biological ties, but also to the reality
that a mother's presence at her child's birth does not necessarily result in a meaningful
parent-child relationship consisting of "everyday ties" between mother and child. As
Justice O'Connor argued in her dissenting opinion, joined by three other justices, even
though it may be a biological truism that a mother will always be present at her child's
birth, a mother
49

50

may not have an opportunity for a [meaningful] relationship [with the child] if
the child is removed from his or her mother on account of alleged abuse or
neglect, or if the child and mother are separated by tragedy, such as disaster or
war, of the sort apparently present in this case.
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 86-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
51 This approach, of course, was largely influenced by the way the parties to the
litigation framed the issue. See generally Brief of Petitioners, Brief of Respondents, and
Amicus Briefs in Support of Petitioners, Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (No. 99-2071), 2000 WL
1706737. For purposes of the litigation, equal protection and gender discrimination
probably afforded the most promising challenge the petitioners could make.
52 For an excellent discussion of Nguyen from the perspective of the parents (gender
equality, the rights of fathers, or equal protection), see generally Kif Augustine-Adams,
Gendered States: A Comparative Construction of Citizenship and Nation, 41 VA. J. INT'L
L. 93 (2000); Dowd, supra note 15; and Jacqueline Barrett, Note, Nguyen v. INS: Are Sex
Based Classifications in Citizenship Laws Really Constitutional?, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMPo
LJ. 391 (2002). See also Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74-97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Nguyen and other immigration cases,53 it is the children who are denied
citizenship, or even worse, deported.
Perhaps a more troubling aspect of the Court's opinion is that it seemingly
overlooked the social and historical backdrop from which the litigation sprang.
Missing from the opinion is the significant fact that Nguyen was part of a class of
mixed-race children-Amerasians-who were not only connected to the United
States through the intimate channel of their American fathers' blood, but who had
also been placed in their position through accident of birth and through the
combined action of parents, government, and society. Amerasians can generally be
described as children who have been involuntarily born of war, shunned by the
people and societies that brought about their existence, and trapped between two
national and cultural identities while belonging to neither.
Relatively little legal scholarship has been devoted to the history and plight of
Amerasians over the years, even though the United States government has
statutorily recognized their existence to address, albeit inadequately, the myriad
problems they have faced. This Note is aimed at shedding more light onto this
class of largely forgotten children who, in the opinion of the author, should
rightfully be considered not only children but also citizens of America, for
humanitarian as well as jurisprudential reasons. At the same time, this Note places
Nguyen in a larger social and historical context than that which appears on the
textual face of the Court's opinion, and as a result focuses the analysis more on the
children and less on the parents. 54
Part II of this Note provides a more detailed history of Amerasians, including
the legal steps the United States has taken in addressing the dire circumstances in
which these children have found themselves over the last few decades. Part III
provides a broad overview of Congress's plenary power in the area of immigration,
followed by a discussion of citizenship and deportation, particularly how they
affect Amerasians, such as Nguyen, in serious ways. Part N makes
recommendations to Congress on how it can improve the lives of Amerasians and
other similarly situated classes of children.

53 See, e.g., Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissing
Barthelemy's petition for review of order of removal because his parents were never
married).
54 This discussion, therefore, does not deal exclusively with Nguyen or section 309,
but with the larger context of Amerasian history and legislation, and their struggle for
identity and survival. Of cour:se, Nguyen and section 309 each occupies an important role
in, and acts as a springboard for, this discussion of that larger context.
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II. AMERASIANS: HISTORY, LEGISLATION,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR IDENTITY AND SURVIVAL
A. Children ofthe Dust

Since World War II, the United States military has encouraged sexual
relations between United States servicemen and East Asian women abroad. 55
Because of harsh conditions faced by soldiers stationed overseas, especially at
times of war, these young men "frequently felt the need to find solace in women
and liquor."56 The United States military, in tum, felt the need to placate, if not
reward, its soldiers for their military efforts, and to "preserve the soldiers'
morale.,,57
During the Vietnam War, for instance, the- military encouraged this behavior
"as a way to escape from the rigors of jungle warfare.,,58 In what they called "Rest
and Recreation" ("R&R"),59 single servicemen were sent to "exotic" cities where
they were given access to local wotnen-prostitutes. 6o Although the United States
and the international community had· by then denounced prostitution as harmful,
and had enacted policies in an attempt to control it,61 military commanders
nevertheless helped establish military brothels in cities like Danan where they did
everything from regulating the price of prostitution to checking the health of
prostitutes for sexually transmitted diseases, usually with the help of the local

55 Robin S. Levi, Note, Legacies of War: The United States' Obligation toward
Amerasians, 29 STAN. J. INT'LL. 459,459-60 (1993). See generally Gwyn Kirk & Carolyn
Bowen Francis, Redefining Security: Women Challenge U.S. Military Policy and Practice
in East Asia, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 239-48 (2000) (noting the negative social
effects of United States military presence on host communities in East Asia, including
military prostitution, the abuse of local women, and the dire situation of mixed-race
children fathered by United States servicemen).
56 Levi, supra note 55, at 466.
57 Id. at 467~ see also CYNTHIA ENLOE, THE MORNING AFfER: SEXUAL POLITICS AT
THE END OF THE COLD W AR 142-60, 183 (1993) (noting that in Central America, Vietnam,
the Philippines, South Korea, Puerto Rico, Germany, Italy, and even the mainland United
States, the Pentagon has operated as if prostitution were a necessary and integral part of
United States military operations)~ Emily Nyen Chang, Note, Engagement Abroad:
Enlisted Men, U.S. Military Policy and the Sex Industry, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'y 621, 625 (2001) ("Military brothels grew from the desire to keep the enlisted
men happy, analogizing sex to movies, laundry service, and other necessary luxury items."
(citation omitted)).
58 Levi, supra note 55, at 466.
59 Chang, supra note 57, at 621.
60 See Kirk & Francis, supra note 55, at 241 (noting that in South Korea, Japan, and
the Philippines, prostitution was officially forbidden but practiced under such euphemisms
as the "hospitality industry" or simply "entertainment")~ Levi, supra note 55, at 467.
61 Chang, supra note 57, at 621.
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government. 62 This practice led to the births of tens of thousands of mixed-race
children known as "Amerasians," not only in Vietnam but also in South Korea, the
Philippines, and other East Asian countries that have had a large United States
military presence. 63
Amerasians born in Vietnam were often fatherless because their American
fathers had either died on the battlefields or left after completing their tours of
duty, sometimes unaware of or indifferent to whether they had fathered an
Amerasian child. 64 Even the soldiers who wanted to bring their children back to the
United States often faced tremendous difficulties. While the military encouraged
recreational sex among its soldiers, it disapproved of long-term relations between
the soldiers and Vietnamese women. 65 As a result, once the soldiers completed
their tours of duty in Vietnam,66 it was incredibly difficult for them to get past the
bureaucratic hurdles and bring their Vietnamese children, wives, or girlfriends
back to the United States. 67 A few tried but to no avail. 68
Because of this, thousands of Amerasians were left to suffer poverty,
abandonment, homelessness, malnutrition, official and unofficial discrimination,
harassment, sexual abuse, torture, and general resentment in their native country.
Amerasians were treated poorly by their government as well as their own people,
including those closest to them. This stemmed from the fact that these children
were the visual representations of "U.S. military intervention in Asia.,,69
Accordingly, they were given degrading labels such as bui doi (literally meaning
"dust of life") in Vietnam, indicating "the sentiment that [they were] lower than the
dirt one walks on.,,70 In the Philippines they were "throw-away" children, and in
South Korea they were "half breed.,,71

62

Id. at 628, 633; Kirk & Francis, supra note 55, at 241-45; Levi, supra note 55, at

467.
63 Levi, supra note 55, at 460; see also Kirk & Francis, supra note 55, at 259 (noting
that since the United States occupation of various Asian countries beginning in 1898,
United States servicemen have fathered between an estimated 30,000 and 50,000
Amerasian children).
64 Levi, supra note 55, at 468; see also ROBERT S. MCKELVEY, THE DUST OF LIFE:
AMERICA'S CHILDREN ABANDONED IN VIETNAM 102 (1999) (noting that while some
Americans took responsibility for their children, most did not, leaving many Amerasians
and their mothers to fend for themselves).
65 Levi, supra note 55, at 467.
66 The military's policy in South Korea and the Philippines, including its co-operation
of brothels and its prohibition of long-term relations between United States servicemen and
local women, was similar to that which existed in Vietnam. Id. at 468-69.
67 I d.
68 I d. at 467-68.
69 Id. at 460.
7° Id.
71 I d.
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Vietnamese Amerasians, the largest documented group of Amerasians,72 were
denied educational and employment opportunities because they were considered
"collaborators" or "children" of the enemy.73 Many were abandoned not only by
their American fathers but also by their Vietnamese mothers and subsequent
caretakers, who were ashamed of the child's mixed race,74 could not afford to care
for the child, or simply could not handle the discrimination they suffered for'
having the child. 75 In school, Amerasians were taunted, assaulted, and generally
looked down upon by their teachers as well as their classmates. Many dropped out
of school as a result. 76
Further, their mothers were labeled traitors and whores for prostituting and
mingling with the enemy.77 Little did anyone, including the American soldiers
stationed there, seem to know or care that many of these women were "prostitutes
by necessity, by circumstances, and by all of the destruction of war.,,78 Many had
to prostitute to put food on the table, and others were sold into prostitution by their
families. 79 In addition, many of their Amerasian children may have been a product
of rape rather than consensual sex with the soldiers. 80
Nevertheless, because Vietnam was largely a homogeneous society where
pure blood was valued over mixed blood, and a patriarchal society where standing
in society depended on one's husband or father, without a father figure it was very

72 Id. But see Joseph M. Ahern, Comment, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: United States
Immigration Law and Policy as Applied to Filipino-Amerasians, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POL'y J.
105, 120 (1992) ("[M]ore Amerasians have been born in the Philippines than in all other
Asian countries combined, including Vietnam." (footnote omitted)).
73 MCKELVEY, supra note 64, at 3, 36; see also Levi, supra note 55, at 469, 471.
74 Stephen L. Bennett, Comment, The Vietnamese Shrimpers of Texas: Salvaging a
Sinking Industry, 6 SCHOLAR 287, 303 (2004) (noting that many in Vietnam viewed an
Amerasian's mixed blood as a symbol of "disunity and a dissolution of the national
blood").
75 See McKELVEY, supra note 64, at 3,36; Levi, supra note 55, at 472; Mary Eileen
English, Resettling Vietnamese Amerasians: What Have We Learned?, at 57 (2001) (Ed.D.
dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst), available at http://scholarworks.umass.
edu/dissertations/AAI3027195/ (follow "Download the dissertation" hyperlink to order the
publication in PDP format) .
76 Levi, supra note 55, at 472.
77 See ide at 470-72.
78 English, supra note 75, at 58 (quoting Lucy Nguyen, a caseworker with Lutheran
Child and Family Services); see also TRIN YARBOROUGH, SURVIVING TWICE, AMERASIAN
CHILDREN OF THE VIETNAM WAR 16-20 (2005) (detailing the events giving rise to and
surrounding the prostitution industry in Vietnam during the war); Chang, supra note 57, at
638-39 (noting that the U.S. military bases were often situated "in already economically
depressed countries," and many of these women had to choose "between extreme poverty
and prostitution").
79 See English, supra note 75, at 60.
80 Id.; see also infra note 204 and accompanying text.
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difficult for an Amerasian to function in the society.81 Consequently, many ended
up in orphanages or on the streets of Ho Chi Minh City as gang members or
prostitutes. 82 Others were forced to live in the harsh, isolated conditions of
communist Vietnam's "New Economic Zones.,,83
Amerasians throughout Asia faced similar difficulties. In South Korea,
Amerasians suffered similar levels of "poverty, discrimination, and solitude.,,84
They were "taunted for their American-looking features and . . . branded as
children of imperialists and prostitutes."s5 In the Philippines, many Amerasians
were born into poverty near the military bases and, as a result, ended up in the bar
system that had facilitated their birth. 86 Many Filipino Amerasians were also sold
or abandoned by their mothers and, like Amerasians elsewhere, were resented
because they were reminders of United States intervention.87
Because of their unbearable situation, Amerasians often negatively projected
their frustrations onto others and society, (through criminal activity) or onto
themselves. 88 With respect to the latter, it was not infrequent for young
Amerasians, males in particular, to mutilate themselves if they had not committed

81 STEVEN DEBONIS, CHILDREN OF THE ENEMY: ORAL HISTORIES OF VIETNAMESE
AMERASIANS AND THEIR MOTHERS 6 (1995); Levi, supra note 55, at 469-70. For a while,
the Vietnamese government even considered Amerasians as United States nationals, not
only out of contempt for Amerasians but also because, in Vietnam, one's citizenship
stemmed from the father. Id.; see also 131 CONG. REc. 5, 5978 (1985) (statement of Rep.
Smith) ("Amerasian children are currently the object of either official or unofficial
discrimination in the countries where they now reside . . . . Since the Amerasian child has
been abandoned by his or her American father, the opportunities for social acceptance, a
good education, job, and marriage are almost nonexistent."); Diane H. Yoon, The American
Response to Amerasian Identity and Rights, 7 BERKELEY MCNAIR REs. J. 71, 72-73
(1999), available at http://www-mcnair.berkeley.edul99McNairJournal/yoon/yoon.pdf
(noting that in Korea, as in many East Asian countries, a person's birth and death are
recorded and kept in her hometown; however, if the child was born out of wedlock,
especially to a foreign soldier who has since disappeared, the mother is not able to register
the child; lacking legal documentation of her existence, the child is basically stateless and
therefore cannot attend school); MaryKim DeMonaco, Note, Disorderly Departure: An
Analysis of the United States Policy toward Amerasian Immigration, 15 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
641, 648 (1989) (noting that in Vietnam, fathers customarily claimed legal paternity,
registered their child's birth, and took care of their child's school enrollment).
82 Levi, supra note 55, at 472.
83 MCKELVEY, supra note 64, at 9. New Economic Zones ("NEZs") were previously
unsettled or sparsely settled regions of Vietnam to which former South Vietnamese military
and officials, their families, Amerasians, and others were sent as settlers to expand
Vietnam's cultivatable land and reduce urban crowding. Id. at 124.
84 Levi, supra note 55, at 473-74.
85 I d. at 473.
86 Id. at 474-75.
87 Id. at 475.
88 See Yoon, supra note 81, at 74-75.
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suicide. 89 For instance, Steven DeBonis, while collecting oral histories of
Amerasians at the Philippines Refugee Processing Center ("PRPC"), made the
following observations on a young Vietnamese Amerasian male:
I caught a glimpse of him as he came in out of the weather and entered
the billet next door, wearing only gym shorts and flip-flops. Self-inflicted
bums and slash marks are common among Amerasians, but never had I
seen them to this extent. The young man's torso, arms, and legs had been
terribly mutilated. Raised lines of scar tissue overlay his body, one slash
criss-crossing into the next. Tattooed ladies danced across his belly ....
. . . Like many in the PRPC, he has left family behind. He worries
about his wife and child in Vietnam; foremost in his thoughts is how to
bring them to America once he arrives there. When he mentions them,
his eyes swell with tears. 90

B. Coming to America
Soon after its withdrawal, the United States government began reassessing its
policies in Vietnam, specifically with respect to the thousands of children who
came to be known as "Amerasians" and whom many in the United States learned
had been fathered by American soldiers but abandoned in that country during the
war. 91 Realizing the plight of these children back in Vietnam, legislators felt that
the United States had a moral obligation to bring these children to America to
reunite them with their American fathers if possible. 92 One congressman even
described the Amerasian problem as "a national embarrassment" for the United
States. 93
The first major United States legislation that specifically addressed the
Amerasian problem was a set of amendments to the INA in 1982 known as the
Amerasian Immigration Act. 94 These amendments placed Amerasians from
89 Id. ("Bombarded from childhood with comments and actions that point to their ...
difference, many Amerasians display extremely negative conceptions about themselves.").
90 DEBONIS, supra note 81, at 98-99.
91 See Ranjana Natarajan, Amerasians and Gender-Based Equal Protection under
U.S. Citizenship Law, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 123, 125-26 (1998).
92 See ide
93 Amerasian Citizenship Initiative, Vietnamese Amerasians in America, http://www.
amerasianusa.org/ (select the "Issue Overview" hyperlink from the left-most pane) (quoting
Senator Stewart B. McKinney) (internal quotation marks omitted) (last visited Nov. 1,
2006).
94 Act of Oct. 22, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-359, 96 Stat. 1716 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1154 (2006)). Prior to the 1982 amendments, Amerasians were admitted through a
United Nations-sponsored program known as the "Orderly Departure Program"; however,
because of the over-inclusive nature of that program it did not effectively address the
Amerasian problem. See DeMonaco, supra note 81, at 643.
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Vietnam, Korea, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand in the highest preference category
for immigration. 95 An Amerasian wishing to immigrate to the United States under
the 1982 amendments had to petition the Attorney General for an immigrant visa,
providing proof that she was fathered by a United States citizen and was born
between 1950 and 1982.96 Her physical appearance, along with documentary proof
if any, was considered in deciding whether to issue her a visa. 97
Because of strict provisions, the lack of diplomatic ties between the United
States and Vietnam, the exclusion of Amerasians in other East Asian countries, and
other various problems, the 1982 amendments were largely unsuccessful in helping
Amerasians as a class. 98 A subsequent effort by President Ronald Reagan, known
as the 1984 Amerasian Initiative, was also unsuccessful in that regard. President
Reagan's initiative specifically permitted Vietnamese Amerasians to immigrate to
the United States along with their families, whereas the 1982 amendments only
allowed an Amerasian to immigrate to the United States alone and therefore
leaving any loved ones behind. 99 Unfortunately, strained relations between the
United States and Vietnam prevented the initiative from realizing its full
potential. 100
Meanwhile, through the media the American public became increasingly
aware of and emotionally invested in the existence and plight of its Amerasian
children in Vietnam. 10l At the public's behest, Congress revisited the Amerasian
problem in 1987. 102 That year, Congress passed the Indochinese Refugee
Resettlement and Protection Act, popularly known as the Amerasian Homecoming
Act. 103 The Homecoming Act provided that all Amerasians born in Vietnam
between January 1, 1962, and January 1, 1976, could immigrate to the United
States along with their immediate family, guardians, or a spouse. 104 The Act also
exempted Amerasians from immigration quotas and, to appease the Vietnamese

95

Levi, supra note 55, at 485-86.

I d. at 486.
97 I d.

96

98 Id.; see also English, supra note 75, at 17 (noting that the 1982 Act "had no
enforceability in the cases of thousands of Amerasians in Vietnam" because of a lack of
diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam).
99 Levi, supra note 55, at 486-87.
100 Id. at 487.
101 YARBOROUGH, supra note 78, at 101. In 1987, the Long Island Newsday carried a
photograph showing a blond-haired, blue-eyed, fourteen-year-old Amerasian boy who had
been crippled by polio as a child and was now earning a living by dragging himself on his
hands and knees through the streets of Vietnam, begging. Id.
102

I d.

Indochinese Refugee Resettlement and Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100
202, 101 Stat. 1329.
104 Id.
103
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government, did not classify Amerasians as "refugees,,105 even though they were
eligible for full refugee benefits. 106
Under the Act, United States officials interviewed Amerasians in Ho Chi
Minh City.107 If an Amerasian received permission to immigrate to the United
States, the Amerasian and her family were first sent to a refugee camp in the
Philippines for six months of English lessons and "cultural orientation.,,108 After
they completed that training, the immigrants were sent to the United States. Once
they arrived in the United States, they were taken to one of many cluster sites
located~ throughout the country, where community volunteer agencies helped them
with school or vocational training and helped them take advantage of social
services.109
Although the Act was more comprehensive than its predecessors in
addressing the Amerasian problem, there were still shortcomings. For example, in
the aforementioned interviews, parentage was established if possible through
documentary evidence such as birth certificates, letters, and photographs. 110
Unfortunately, because most families destroyed records of their Amerasian child's
birth out of embarrassment or fear of reprisal by their government,111 interviewers
had to rely mostly on their instincts; where documents had been destroyed, the
Amerasians "face [was her] passport.,,112
In addition to establishing the Amerasian's parentage, interviewers tried to
determine whether family members who wanted to accompany the Amerasian to
the United States had bona fide, familial-like ties with the Amerasian. 113
Frequently, many Amerasians sold themselves, or were sold by their families, to
others who merely wanted a ticket to the United States by pretending to be a
family member of the Amerasian. 114 Once the Amerasian and her "family" reached
105 The United States government originally intended to classify Amerasians as
"refugees" under the Act, which would have exempted them from annual immigration
quotas; however, the Vietnamese government insisted that Amerasians were not refugees at
all but were children and citizens of America, and they were therefore the responsibility of
America. The United States government resolved this conflict by not labeling Amerasians
as "refugees" but still granting them the same benefits granted to refugees, and using the
resettlement process that was "normally used for refugees." YARBOROUGH, supra note 78,
at 103.
106 Levi, supra note 55, at 489-90.
107 Id. at 490.
108 Id. Prejudice against Amerasians persisted at these refugee camps, which handled
the resettlement of (in addition to Amerasians and their accompanying "relatives") former
political prisoners, boat refugees, and those who were being sponsored by Vietnamese
relatives already residing in the United States. YARBOROUGH, supra note 78, at 126.
109 Levi, supra note 55, at 490.
110

I d.

111

MCKELVEY, supra note 64, at 47.

Levi, supra note 55, at 490.
Id.
114 I d.

112
113
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the United States, the Amerasian' was, not infrequently, either abandoned or subject
to further scorn and discrimination within her home and community. 115
Because the interview in Vietnam was the last stage where the United States
government could "prevent family members operating under false pretenses or
those who [were] not even truly family members from benefiting from the
Homecoming Act,,,116 interviewers were at times overly cautious in issuing visas.
This resulted in the arbitrary decline of many Amerasian applications and their
family merrlbers who were otherwise eligible for a visa under the Act. A typical
rejection letter, often unsigned, informed the rejected Amerasian:
On the basis of the information provided by you . . . and on the basis of
the results of a personal interview of you by the consular officer, it has
been determined that you do not meet the requirements for consideration
of an Amerasian visa. Specifically, you do not have the physical
appearance that is characteristic of Amerasians, you do not possess
documentation that would support a claim of Amerasian status, and you
are not able to provide a personal account that would support a finding of
Amerasian status . . . . We regret that this decision could not have been
favorable. 117

c.

Life in America and Now

Amerasians 118 who arrived in the United States continued to face many of the
same difficulties they faced in their native country. First, as noted above, deeply
ingrained prejudice within the Vietnamese community against mixed-race children
persisted in America. Also, because many survived on the streets as criminals or
prostitutes in Vietnam, they had little formal education and familial support before
coming to the United States. 119 Consequently, they were "at a higher risk for
problems such as drug use, crime, and suicide than previous Indochinese
immigrants."120 They were subject to constant feelings of alienation and
depression. 121 lliiteracy in both the Vietnamese and English languages, coupled
115
116

Id.
Id. at 491.

117 YARBOROUGH, supra note 78, at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted). This was
an actual form letter from the u.s. consulate in Vietnam, dated May 1999, to an Amerasian
man rejecting his application for an Amerasian visa. Id.
118 Although this discussion focuses mainly on Vietnamese Amerasians, the
experience of Vietnamese Amerasians (in their native country and then in the United
States) is fairly representative of the experience of Amerasians from other countries. Levi,
supra note 55, at 493. However, except where noted otherwise, the term "Amerasian(s)" as
used throughout the remainder of this discussion refers to those from Vietnam.
119

12°
121

Id.
Id.
Id. at 496.
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with their inability to cope with the American school environment, contributed to a
high dropout rate. 122
In addition, Amerasians suffered from another problem in the United States,
perhaps most detrimental of all: the inability to reunite with their long-lost
American fathers. For many, especially those who had been abandoned by their
mothers and rejected by their society, reuniting with their American fathers
became their last hope for a life worth living.123 Unfortunately, very few
Amerasians had "identifying information about their fathers" aside from "names
and hometowns.,,124 Privacy laws and government inactivity also hampered the
ability of many Amerasians to locate their fathers, and vice versa. 125
Even when an Amerasian successfully reunites with her father, he may reject
her "or the reunion[] otherwise fail[s] to work OUt.,,126 Undoubtedly, either of these
situations is a devastating blow for the Amerasian. Her Asian mother has rejected
her. The people in her native country have long rejected and resented her. Her
American father has now rejected her as well. Without adequate exposure,
education, and assimilation into her fatherland, and without a community network
committed to guiding and supporting her, she does not have what it takes to
function in the complexities of modem-day America.
Despite the aforementioned legislation, the United States government has
never treated its Amerasian children as full citizens, but as aliens-outsiders-who
are only eligible for citizenship upon affirmative action undertaken either by their
fathers (through section 309) or by themselves (through naturalization). 127 Rejected
by her father and not fully welcomed in America, the Amerasian in the above
scenario may be inclined to return to the country where she grew up, but because
discrimination against Amerasians continues in her native country and she lacks
the legal and financial means to return, this is neither an enticing nor a realistic
option. Stranded in the United States, she now finds herself in the dilemma of
having been born-through no fault of her own-as a war child of two societies,

122
123

[d. at 495-96.
See, e.g., YARBOROUGH, supra note 78, at 247 (explaining the guilt the author felt

when an Amerasian male took his own life shortly after she had told him he was never
going to find his American father).
124 Levi, supra note 55, at 494.
125 [d.; see also THOMAS BASS, VIElNAMERICA: THE WAR COMES HOME 189-90
(1996) (noting that the Department of Defense had a policy of withholding the names of its
military personnel, which prevented thousands of Amerasians living in America from
reuniting with their fathers); YARBOROUGH, supra note 78, at 122 (noting that the United
States government's policy to "protect the privacy" of its American fathers "prevented
access to simple records that would have helped thousands more Amerasians locate their
dads").
126 Levi, supra note 55, at 495 (citations omitted); see also MCKELVEY, supra note
64, at 102 ("A very few [Amerasians]-perhaps two or three percent-actually locate their
American fathers and reunite with them. Such reunions are often not successful.").
127 See infra Part III.B.
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but belonging to neither. 128 She ultimately lacks a national and cultural identity as
well as a place to call home. 129 At the least, she now realizes why, on the other side
of the globe, they call her and others like her "children of the dust."
A famous quotation attributed to William Gladstone from over a century ago
instructs that "justice delayed is justice denied.,,130 The Vietnamese Amerasians
were denied justice from the day of their conception when the United States
military encouraged its soldiers to have recreational sex with local Vietnamese
women, but discouraged those soldiers from taking responsibility for the resultant
offspring. 13 ! To compound the problem, the United States government delayed
taking serious responsibility for its blond-haired, blue-eyed Amerasian children
from the time when the last United States troops withdrew from that country in
1975 to the passage of the Homecoming Act twelve years later in 1987.
The Homecoming Act has brought thousands of Amerasian children to the
United States who would otherwise have continued to live in poverty on the streets
of Vietnam, committing crimes or prostituting while hoping for the day when their
American fathers would return to take them away to a better place. The Act has
brought in an estimated 30,000 Amerasians, accompanied by another 80,000 of
their "relatives," since its passage. 132 The Act has also provided an improved
environment for these children as they settle in the United States and has helped
them acquire some of the skills and education necessary to achieve assimilation in
American society.
However, despite its successes, the Act has yet to eliminate all of the
problems experienced by Amerasians. Although the statistics are uncertain, it is
estimated that thousands of Amerasians remain scattered throughout various parts
of Vietnam, typically in rural or remote regions of the country. 133 Also, because the
128 See DeMonaco, supra note 81, at 641 ("The progeny of the ultimate meeting of
East and West-the Amerasians-belong to neither society; they are not considered Asians
nor are they accepted as Americans.").
129 See Yoon, supra note 81, at 72 (arguing that United States immigration policy,
namely its unwillingness to grant an Amerasian automatic citizenship, neglects to address
the primary source of an Amerasian's "hardship-their inability to establish a legitimate
national identity"). For a broader perspective on the Amerasian identity crisis, see Shandon
Phan, Vietnamese Amerasians in America (2003), Asian-Nation: The Landscape of Asian
America, http://www.asian-nation.org/amerasians.shtml.
130 Peter Sessions, Note, Swift Justice?: Imposing a Statute of Limitations on the
Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions of State Prisoners, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1513, 1568
(1997).
131 See supra notes 55--68 and accompanying text.
132 YARBOROUGH, supra note 78, at 123; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
VIETNAMESE AMERASIAN RESEITLEMENT EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND FAMILY
OUTCOMES IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1994), 1994 WL 810587, available at
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat4/151037.pdf (noting that as of March 1994, approximately
75,000 Vietnamese Amerasians and their families had resettled in the United States under
the Homecoming Act).
133 Id. at 224.
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Act was written exclusively for Vietnamese Amerasians, Amerasians from other
countries such as South Korea and the Philippines have benefited little, if at all,
from the Act, even though their situations are equally as bad as those from
Vietnam. Estimates of non-Vietnamese Amerasians living around the world
number in the tens of thousands.134
For Amerasians who were fortunate enough to come to the United States, the
cycle of abandonment, poverty, illiteracy, and crime that was destined for them
since birth continues to hamper their ability to be accepted and productive
members of American society.135 Unspoken racism and discrimination against
Amerasians persist in pocket Vietnamese communities throughout the United
States, where most Amerasians reside,136 thus preventing them from living happy
and fulfilling lives. An inability to reunite with their American fathers also instills
in them a sense of doom, helplessness, hopelessness, and a lack of self identity.137
Also, as alluded to above, the United States government has not yet granted
automatic citizenship to its Amerasian children, even though these children are
genetically connected to the United States through the seeds their American fathers
planted and despite the fact that the United States has implicitly acknowledged its
responsibility for these children by resettling them in the United States and
providing them full refugee-type benefits. In 2003, a bill was proposed in the 108th
Congress that, if passed, would have granted automatic citizenship to Amerasians
who had already resettled in the United States under the Homecoming Act. 138
However, this bill was defeated. 139 Without citizenship status, Amerasians are
treated like any other class of aliens and, as a result, they are deprived of the full

Kirk & Francis, supra note 55, at 259.
See Amerasian Citizenship Initiative, http://www.amerasianusa.org/ (follow "Issue
overview" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) ("[L]ife in America is still a daily struggle
against poverty and all kinds of problems: mental health, social isolation, discrimination,
language barrier[s], lack of job opportunities, violence. Due to their lack of education and
survival skills, most of them can only find low-paying, entry-level jobs and live in poor,
poverty-stricken neighborhoods. And many continue to show symptoms of psychological
disorders.").
136 Id. (noting that Vietnamese Amerasians who are residing in the United States
today "concentrate in metropolitan areas, usually around the Vietnamese community").
137 See Cynthia R. Mabry, Who Is the Baby's Daddy (And Why Is It Importantfor the
Child to Know)?, 34 U. BALT. L. REv. 211, 212 (2004) (noting that a child's identity is
developed through interaction with her father and that a child has a better chance of
"complete psychological development" when a responsible male role model is involved in
the child's life); English, supra note 75, at 34 ("In Vietnam, a person's identity comes from
one's relationship with one's family, especially the father.").
138 Amerasian Naturalization Act of 2003, H.R. 3360, 108th Congo (2003).
139 Another bill was introduced in 2005 by Representative Zoe Lofgren of California
that, like the 2003 bill, would provide automatic citizenship for certain Amerasians; the bill
is currently pending in the House with seemingly little support. Amerasian Naturalization
Act, H.R. 2687, 109th Congo (2005).
134

135
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range of rights and privileges available only to citizens. 14o As Nguyen illustrates,
this can sometimes have devastating consequences for the Amerasian.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLE: PLENARY POWER, CITIZENSHIP, AND
DEPORTATION

A. The Plenary Power Doctrine
No discussion pertaining to United States immigration law is adequate
without a discussion of what is generally known as the "plenary power doctrine,"
which played a pivotal role in the Court's decision in Nguyen 141 and will continue
to play a pivotal role in the Court's treatment of other aliens, including
Amerasians. This section provides a broad overview of the plenary power doctrine
as it relates to United States immigration law. The next two sections discuss two
specific areas of immigration law: citizenship and deportation, including the
negative effects they can have on Amerasians, individually and as a class.
Citizenship and deportation are chosen for discussion here because they are the
two areas of immigration law that can "make or break" an Amerasian.
Under the plenary power doctrine, the federal government-specifically,
Congress-exercises broad powers over the nation's immigration policies. The
Supreme Court has consistently held onto the view that "immigration and
naturalization policies pertain exclusively to the political branches of the
government.,,142 The Court has thus given the federal political branches (Congress
and the executive departments, such as the INS, that theoretically enforce
Congress's will) a great amount of deference in immigration-related matters. 143
For the same reason, the Court has subjected the immigration-related
decisions of the federal political branches to very minimal review. 144 The Court has
stated that the "'power to expel or exclude aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign
attribute exercised by the Government's political departments [which is] largely

140 See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation and Justice: A Constitutional Dialogue, 41
B.C. L. REv. 771, 777 (2000) ("[N]oncitizens are required to register with INS, and to be
very careful about how long they remain outside the [United States] .... They are not
allowed to vote, they are ineligible for certain social safety net protections and ineligible
for certain jobs. Their ability to bring family members here is much more limited than that
of citizens." (citations omitted».
141 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 72-73 (2001) ("[W]e need not assess the
implications of statements in our earlier cases regarding the deference afforded to Congress
in the exercise of its immigration and naturalization power." (citations omitted)).

142 RUTH RUBIO-MARIN, IMMIGRATION AS A DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE: CITIZENSHIP
AND INCLUSION IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 137 (2000).
143
144

[d.
[d.
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immune from judicial control",,145 and "'over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than [over immigration matters].,,,146
To illustrate this further, the Court has used the plenary power doctrine to uphold
Congress's exclusion and deportation of aliens on grounds ranging from race and
national origin to sexual orientation and political affiliation. 147 In addition, the
Court has used the plenary power doctrine to insulate Congress's policies
governing "aliens' access to welfare and social benefits," as well as their
participation in various aspects of the political process. 148
Even though courts and legal scholars have generally described Congress's
plenary power over immigration as something that is inherent in the concept of
national sovereignty,149 the plenary power doctrine has nevertheless been traced to
various provisions in the United States Constitution. Although the Constitution
does not contain any specific language giving either Congress or the executive
branch the power to control the entry of foreigners, the Constitution does contain
145 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex reI. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206,210 (1953)).
146 I d. at 137-38 (alterations in original) (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.
Stranhan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)); see ide at 139 n.17 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 603, 604, 606 (1889) ("[T]he power to exclude aliens is an 'incident
of every independent nation' because if a nation could not control its borders 'it would be
to that extent subject to the control of another power .... To preserve its independence,
and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment is the highest duty of every
nation ...."')); see also Matthew v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82 (1976) (stating that deference to
the political branches mandates "a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the
Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization").
147 RUBIo-MARIN, supra note 142, at 139 (citing Fon Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893) (upholding an act of Congress authorizing the deportation of
Chinese laborers under the Chinese Exclusion laws)); see also Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S.
118, 120--22 (1967) (holding that the then-existing "psychopathic personality" ground of
exclusion encompassed homosexuals); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591
(1952) (upholding a statute that provided for the deportation of legal resident aliens
because of past membership in the Communist Party).
148 RUBIo-MARIN, supra note 142, at 133-34, 138. Rubio-Marin also notes that:

[U]nder the common label of immigration matters the Supreme Court has not
substantially distinguished between the claims of aliens to enter the country and
to remain in it once they had settled. Aliens are aliens no matter how long they
have lived in the country. No distinction has been made to accommodate those
aliens who have made the USA their main societal habitat.
Id.; see also Natarajan, supra note 91, at 140 ("Over the past century, the plenary power
doctrine has been invoked to limit judicial review of immigration laws' even where
constitutional claims are asserted.").
149 See, e.g., KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE "HUDDLED MASSES" MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND
CIVIL RIGHTS 4 (2004) ("[T]he courts have emphasized the plenary power of Congress,
based on notions of national sovereignty."); RUBIO-MARIN, supra note 142, at 137.
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language giving Congress the authority to regulate foreign commerce and to adopt
a uniform rule of naturalization. 150 By 1875, the Court had already decided that
Congress has almost complete control over immigration.151 Congress's
immigration policies, therefore, preempt not only the immigration policies of the
other branches of the federal government, but also the immigration policies of the
states.
B. Citizenship

There are three ways a person can acquire United States citizenship under the
immigration law: birthplace citizenship, citizenship by descent, and citizenship
through naturalization. First, a person who is born within the United States or one
of its outlying territories automatically acquires United States citizenship at birth,
regardless of her parents' citizenship status. 152 This process is known as jus soli
citizenship and is the fastest and perhaps most common way of acquiring United
States citizenship. Jus soli citizenship is embedded in the express language of the
Fourteenth Amendment, commanding that "[a]ll persons born ... in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.,,153
The second way a person can acquire United States citizenship is by descent.
That is, if one or both of her parents are United States citizens, and if certain
conditions are met, she will be deemed a United States citizen regardless of the
place of her birth. 154 This process is known as jus sanguinis citizenship, and is
governed primarily by sections 301(c), 301(g), 309(a), and 309(c) of the INA. 155
Unlike jus soli citizenship, jus sanguinis citizenship is not grounded in any express
language of the Constitution. For this reason, jus sanguinis does not necessarily
take effect upon a person's birth, as illu.strated in Nguyen.
Finally, a person can acquire United States citizenship through the
naturalization process. Unlike the first two, naturalization does not depend on a
person's place of birth or her blood ties to a United States national. 156
Naturalization allows a person who has continuously resided in the United States
(lawfully) for a specified number of years, and who has satisfied certain additional
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Henderson v. City of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875) (holding a state restriction on
immigration unconstitutional in violation of foreign commerce clause).
152 See, e.g., Isaacson, supra note 5, at 316. This means that even children of
undocumented immigrants acquire automatic, jus soli citizenship if they are born within the
United States or one of its outlying territories.
153 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2006).
154 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) & (g); 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)-(c).
155 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557); Isaacson, supra note 5, at 317.
156 See 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (requiring a basic knowledge of the English language, U.S.
history, and U.S. government); 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (requiring a limited period of continued
residence in the U.S.).
150

151
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requirements listed in the INA,157 to become a United States cItIzen. In other
words, naturalization allows those who are not otherwise "natural-born" United
States citizens to become United States citizens and, consequently, reap the
benefits that go along with being a United States citizen.
Naturalization is especially beneficial if not imperative for those who have
lived in the United States for many years, have established strong ties with the
United States, and have basically considered themselves a part of the American
national political community. Many who naturalize may have lived in the United
States for most of their lives, may have lost most or all of their native culture and
language, and may have even had children born in the United States. Being a
naturalized citizen affords them a higher sense of belonging and security,
especially because it lets them take part in all national elections,158 the results of
which undoubtedly affect their lives, and hold most public offices. 159 Being a
naturalized citizen also protects them from being easily deported for what may
seem like inadvertent or otherwise minor criminal offenses. 16o
Jus soli is obviously not available for most Amerasians because, as seen
above, a vast majority of Amerasians were born abroad; indeed, Amerasians are
almost by definition born abroad. Naturalization, on the other hand, is not a very
enticing or realistic option for Amerasians either, as it requires "an extended"
period of continued residence in the United States in addition to a basic
understanding of United States history and government; it also requires a basic
grasp of the English language. 161 As noted above, many Amerasians stopped going
to school at a very young age and have an almost nonexistent understanding of
English. 162 For most Amerasians, therefore, jus sanguinis is the most appropriate

See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
See U.S. CaNST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.").
159 See RUBIo-MARIN, supra note 142, at 133-34 (noting that, although aliens are
denied the right "to run for office at least in national and state elections," naturalized
citizens may serve as senators and representatives of the United States).
160 See JOHNSON, supra note 149, at 118 (noting that under the current immigration
law, seemingly minor crimes such as possession of a controlled substance, driving under
the influence of alcohol, and even shoplifting can lead to deportation).
161 See supra note 156 (citing the United States Code English-language and residence
requirements for naturalization).
162 See Bennett, supra note 74, at 303-05 ("Many [Amerasians] are illiterate resulting
in their inability to pass the written U.S. citizenship exam.... Now in their 30s, most
illiterate Amerasians have lost hope that they will ever acquire the ability to read or write.
Since the passage of the Amerasian Homecoming Act of 1987, more than 60 percent have
yet to acquire U.S. citizenship. In contrast, according to a report by the Urban Institute,
'nearly half of the nation's legal immigrants had become citizens by 2002.'" (citations
omitted)); English, supra note 75, at 51 (noting that a high percentage of Vietnamese
Amerasians are illiterate in both Vietnamese and English).
157
158
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method of acquiring United States citizenship. Nguyen apparently tried to petition
for jus sanguinis citizenship, specifically through section 309 of the INA.
Notwithstanding section 309' s differential treatment of the genders, its
requirements are not terribly difficult to satisfy. To reiterate, the American father
of a foreign-born, out-of-wedlock child merely has to prove: first, he was a United
States national at the time the child was born 163 (the same requirement imposed on
citizen mothers); second, he has a blood relationship with the child by "clear and
convincing evidence"l64 (DNA testing would probably suffice); and third, he has
agreed in writing that he will provide financial support for the child while the child
is under eighteen 165 (not a daunting task).
In addition to these three requirements, a fourth requirement must be satisfied
in one of three ways while the child is under age eighteen: the child's legitimacy is
established under the law of the child's residence or domicile; the father
acknowledges paternity in writing under oath; or the father's paternity is
established by adjudication of a competent court. 166 Despite the affirmative nature
of this fourth requirement, it seems fairly easy to satisfy and section 309 provides a
grace period of eighteen years starting from the date the child is born for it to be
satisfied. 167
Nevertheless, as lenient as it may seem textually, in practice section 309 acts
as a serious obstacle for many Amerasians in their path towards citizenship. For
one, by requiring fathers to take affirmative action before their Amerasian child
turns eighteen, section 309 essentially expects fathers to know its specific
requirements hidden deep within the large body of law that is the United States
immigration code. 168 Although it may be that "ignorance of the law is no excuse,"
this is still a rather irrational or simply unfair statutory scheme, considering that the
same affirmative action is not required of mothers and that the first three
requirements of section 309(a) (those imfosed on fathers) collectively achieve the
same purpose as its fourth requirement. 16
Also, because of their unique situation as a class, many Amerasians may
never have the chance to locate, let alone reunite, with their American fathers. For
many, their American fathers may have died on the battlefields years ago. 170
Where an Amerasian does reunite with her father, she may be very close to or may

8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(2).
Id. § 1409(a)(I).
165 Id. § 1409(a)(3).
166 Id. § 1409(a)(4).
167 I d.
163

164

See Isaacson, supra note 5, at 331-36.
See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 84-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
170 See, e.g., Michael Benge, The Living Hell ofAmerasians, FRONTPAGE MAG., Nov.
168
169

22, 2005, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=20254 (detailing the
tragic life of Tuan Phuoc Le, an Amerasian whose father "died fighting for the freedom of
the Vietnamese").
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have already reached eighteen at the time of the reunion, thereby permanently
barring her from acquiring her father's citizenship under section 309.
The Court in Nguyen casually dismissed this tragic reality by reasoning that:
The statute can be satisfied on the day of birth, or the next day, or the
next 18 years. In this case, the unfortunate, even tragic, circumstance is
that Boulais did not pursue, or perhaps did not know of, these simple
steps and alternatives. Any omission, however, does not nullify the
statutory scheme. 171
The Court then attempted to alleviate this tragic reality by reasoning that:
[section 309] is not the sole means by 'which the child of a citizen father
can attain citizenship. An individual who fails to comply with [section
309], but who has substantial ties to the United States, can seek
citizenship in his or her own right, rather than via reliance on ties to a
citizen parent. 172
The Court was, in essence, saying that if the father cannot give citizenship to his
child, the child can-by naturalizing, that is.
However, as seen above, for most Amerasians, naturalization is not a realistic
option given the educational, psychological, and language barriers facing them. An
Amerasian's acquisition of citizenship, in most instances, depends almost entirely
on her father's knowledge of section 309 and his affirmative action in satisfying its
requirements. Potentially, the Amerasian suffers at the whim of her father's
ignorance or irresponsibility. Although Nguyen had the advantage of having been
raised by his father since he was six years old (and his father, therefore, had plenty
of time to satisfy section 309), Nguyen's situation is more the exception rather than
the rule for Amerasians.
C. Deportation

Just as Congress has a broad amount of discretion in deciding to whom the
government will grant United States citizenship, Congress has a broad amount of
discretion in deciding whom to deport from the country. Deportation is perhaps the
most drastic punishment under immigration law. Indeed, deportation could be
ranked among the law's harshest punishments, comparable to life imprisonment,
termination of parental rights, or capital punishment. As the Supreme Court once
acknowledged, "deportation may result in the loss 'of all that makes life worth
living.'''173 Unfortunately, the courts in this country treat deportation proceedings
171

533 U.S. at 71.

172

I d. (citations omitted).

173

Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (citation omitted).
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as civil rather than criminal; therefore, deportation is not considered a
"punishment" under immigration law however harsh it may seem. 174
Prior to 1996, deportation proceedings consisted of two basic steps.175 In the
first step, the immigration judge determined whether a person was deportable, and
this was based on whether a person's criminal conduct fell within one of the
enumerated grounds for deportation listed in the INA. 176 If a person was deemed
deportable, the immigration judge then determined whether the person should be
deported, and this was done by taking into account the facts and circumstances in
the particular case. 177
The second step in the pre-1996 proceedings basically provided the
immigration judge the opportunity to do an equitable, individualized assessment of
the case before him. The immigration judge was permitted to take into account
such things as the severity of the crime, the alien's ability for rehabilitation, the
alien's ties to the United States versus her ties to her country of origin (or to
wherever she was going to be deported), and the extent to which deportation may
affect any family she may have in the United States. 178 If "the balance of equities
counseled against deportation," the immigration judge could grant the alien relief
from deportation. 179
Unfortunately, in response to the growth in the number of criminal aliens
incarcerated in the nation's prisons 180 and the general desire to get tough on crime,
Congress passed two major pieces of legislation in 1996: the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)181 and the lliegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).182 These laws drastically amended the
174 Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts
about Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1889, 1894-95 (2000) (citing
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) ("While the
consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave, they are not imposed as a
punishment.")); see also Kanstroom, supra note 140, at 784 ("Congress want[s] to maintain
credibility and legitimacy . . . . This is not an intent to punish, just to maintain respect for
the rule-of-Iaw.").
175 Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and
the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1936, 1938-39 (2000).
176 Id.
177

I d.

178

Id.

179

I d. at 1939.

180Id. at 1944. However, Morawetz notes the rise in the number of criminal aliens in
the nation's prisons was also due to the overall rise in incarceration; between 1972 and
1997, national incarceration rates increased fivefold. Id.
181 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 42 U.S.C.), available
at http://www.uscis.govflpB inflpext.dIVinserts/publaw/publaw-8774?f=templates&fn=docu
ment-frame.htm#publaw-pl104132.
182 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 U.S.C.),
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existing body of immigration law with regard to the consequences of criminal
convictions for aliens. 183 Among other things, the laws made deportation
mandatory in large classes of cases. 184 This has, in tum, largely increased the
number of aliens who are deportable under what was the first step of the pre-1996
proceedings. 185 The 1996 laws also virtually eliminated the second step of the pre
1996 proceedings-the individualized assessment. 186
In Nguyen's case, had he had the advantage of the pre-1996 proceedings, in
particular the second step, his chances of being deported would have probably
been much lower considering his individual circumstances. He had lived in the
United States for almost all of his life, and was raised by his American father in
Texas since age SiX. 187 He had hardly known his Vietnamese mother as she had
long abandoned him, and there was no evidence indicating that he ever returned to
Vietnam. 188 There was also no evidence indicating that Nguyen had any living
relatives in Vietnam. 189 Suffice it to say, Nguyen had substantially more ties to the
United States than he had with Vietnam. 190
In addition, Nguyen's immutable and visually obvious mixed race probably
would have been, in the pre-1996 proceedings, a factor for the immigration judge
to consider in deciding whether to deport him back to Vietnam. As discussed
above, post-war communist Vietnam, with its anti-American sentiment coupled
with its traditional, Confucian-inspired emphasis on pure blood and paternity, was
not particularly kind to mixed-race children like Nguyen. Although conditions
appear to have improved somewhat over the years, given that Vietnam is still a
highly homogeneous, class-driven society, and one with a history of human rights
abuses,191 there is reason to believe that prejudice and discrimination against
Amerasians are still present.

available at http://www.uscis.gov/lpBin/lpext.dIVinserts/publaw/publaw-ll124?f=temp
lates&fn=document-frame.htm#publaw-pll 04208.
183 Morawetz, supra note 175, at 1936; see also JOHNSON, supra note 149, at 110 ("In
1996, Congress passed immigration reforms that not only expanded in unprecedented ways
the scope of crimes that can lead to removal of long-term immigrants from the country but
also sought to limit, if not completely foreclose, judicial review of removal orders of aliens
convicted of certain crimes.").
184 Morawetz, supra note 175, at 1936.
185 Id. at 1936, 1939.
186 I d. at 1939.
187 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 15, at 4.
188 See ide at 4-5.
189 See id.; Brief of Respondents, supra note 51, at 5-7.
190 See Assimilation & Ethnic Identity (2006), Asian-Nation: The Landscape of Asian
America, http://www.asian-nation.org/assimilation.shtml ("Sociological research has also
found that the strength of the child's relationship with his/her parents, along with the level
of his/her attachment to the ethnic community . . . play[s an] important role[ ] in
determining ethnic identity among second generation Asian Americans.").
191 Benge, supra note 170.
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By virtually denying immigration judges the opportunity to make an
equitable, individualized assessment of the facts and circumstances in the
particular case, the current immigration law harms not only the alien herself but
also any family she may have in the United States. As one author states, the current
law deprives immigration judges "the opportunity to take family integrity into
consideration.,,192 In the past, family members of an alien who was subject to
deportation had the advantage of "relief hearings" where they had the opportunity
to testify about the effects deportation (Le., separation from the alien) would have
on them. 193 However, the current law eliminates such hearings in most instances. 194
This, in tum, "operate[s] as a statement that the effects of deportation on family
members does not matter.,,195
The current immigration system is especially troubling considering that the
majority of immigration visas issued each year is based on family relationships,
precisely because immigration law, like family law, favors keeping families
(husband and wife, parent and child, and siblings) together. 196 However, by
broadening the classes of deportable crimes, implementing tougher criminal justice
policies, requiring mandatory sentencing pending appeal, and applying vigorous
INS enforcement, among other thin~s, the current immigration law betrays its
traditional emphasis on family unity. 1 7 This betrayal, done in the name of tougher
criminal law enforcement and border control, seriously harms Amerasians and
their families.
Nguyen's situation is particularly ironic if not poignant. Unlike thousands of
other Amerasian children, he had the fortune of leaving post-war communist
Vietnam and reuniting with his American father, something Congress clearly had
intended when it passed the Homecoming ACt. 198 Years later, after Nguyen had
grown up to become an "American," the United States government decided to take
him away from his father and send him back to Vietnam where he, as an
Amerasian, would undoubtedly suffer. This, of course, in no way suggests Nguyen
should be excused for the crimes he committed that led to his deportation.
However, a "balance of equities" may indicate that deportation was too harsh a
penalty.
Certainly for a hypothetical Amerasian in Nguyen's situation who had
committed a less serious deportable offense, such as a simple assault done in the
course of shoplifting, deportation would be unjust. On the other hand, suppose an
individual were convicted of the same crimes for which Nguyen was convicted.
Morawetz, supra note 175, at 1952.
Id. at 1950.
194 Id.
195 I d.
196 Id.; see also Natarajan, supra note 91, at 136 ("Differential treatment of marital
and non-marital foreign-born children in citizenship law [is] also based on legal
preferences for marital families over other familial arrangements." (citation omitted».
197 Morawetz, supra note 175, at 1950.
198 See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
192

193
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Suppose further this individual were Nguyen's age, originally from Zimbabwe, and
committed those crimes after naturalization, but had only lived in the United States
for a total of six years. In this case, immigration law would not mandate
deportation solely because of his citizenship, despite the fact that his overall ties to
the United States (residentially, biologically, culturally, and linguistically) are not
nearly as substantial as Nguyen's. Unfortunately, because of a mere legal
technicality-his father's failure to establish paternity in a timely manner-the
immigration court had no option for Nguyen (a "criminal alien") except
deportation.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

America's involvement in the Vietnam War may have ended, and the war
itself may be over, but the Amerasian problem is far from being a thing of the past.
The United States continues to operate military bases in various parts of East Asia.
As of 2000, there were as many as 37,000 United States troops stationed in ninety
five United States military bases in South Korea l99 and another 63,000 United
States military personnel stationed in Japan. 2OO An agreement between the United
States and the Philippines in late 1999 also grants the United States military access
to various ports in the Philippines. 20l
United States military presence in these and other East Asian countries creates
various problems for the local people, particularly women and children.202 Through
rigorous training and gender socialization, the military overemphasizes the values
of "heroism, physical strength, emotional detachment, the capacity for violence
and killing, and an appearance of invulnerability" among its soldiers. 203 By doing
this, the military instills into the mentality of these young men the idea that they
need to be assertive and controlling, and women are mere sex objects used for
reinforcing their masculinity and satisfying their transient sexual needs. 204
Kirk & Francis, supra note 55, at 232.
Id. at 234.
201 Id. at 238-39.
202 Id. at 239.
203 I d. at 240-41.
204 Id. Susan Brownmiller has written:
199

200

It has been argued that when killing is viewed as not only permissible but heroic
behavior sanctioned by one's government or cause, the distinction between
taking a human life and other forms of impermissible violence gets lost, and
rape becomes an unfortunate but inevitable by-product of the necessary game
called war. . .. The very maleness of the military, the brute power of the
weaponry exclusive to their hands, spiritual bonding of men at arms, the manly
discipline of orders given and orders obeyed, the simple logic of the hierarchical
command, confirms for men what they long suspect, that women are peripheral,
irrelevant to the world that counts, passive spectators to the action in the center
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The military not only tolerates, but encourages this sexist, hyper-masculine
behavior among its soldiers in East Asia by facilitating recreational sex between
the soldiers and the local women, practically institutionalizing prostitution in the
host countries under such euphemisms as "hospitality industry," "rest and relax,"
or simply "entertainment.,,205 The tragic result is the birth of tens of thousands of
unwanted, mixed-race children, like Nguyen, born out of wedlock. Depending on
the culture or social climate of the country in which these children are born, the
familiar cycle of abandonment, poverty, illiteracy, and crime may start allover
again--except next time the focus will have merely shifted from Vietnamese
Amerasians to Amerasians from another country.206
Given Congress's plenary power in the area of immigration, and the Supreme
Court's hands-off approach to this area of the law, Congress is clearly in the best
position among the three federal branches to remedy this semi-worldwide problem.
Ideally, Congress should enact another major piece of legislation like the
Homecoming Act inviting Amerasians who remain in Vietnam207 and other East
Asian countries to come to the United States. After their arrival, Congress should
grant them automatic citizenship without requiring the Amerasians to first locate
and reunite with their American fathers. 208
ring ... as the American presence in Vietnam multiplied, the unspoken military
theory of women's bodies not only as a reward of war but as a necessary
provision like soda pop and ice cream to keep our boys healthy and happy,
turned into routine practice. And if monetary access to women's bodies did not
promote an ideology of rape in Vietnam, neither did it thwart it.
English, supra note 75, at 60 (quoting SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN,
WOMEN AND RAPE 32,33, 92 (1970)).
205 English, supra note 75, at 61.
206 See Bonnie Kae Grover, Note, Aren't These Our Children? Vietnamese Amerasian
Resettlement and Restitution, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & L. 247, 274 (1995) ("While the
youngest of the Vietnamese Amerasians are young adults today, a younger generation of
Amerasians is growing up in other countries.").
207 See YARBOROUGH, supra note 78, at 224-25 (noting that although the
Homecoming Act is officially still in effect, emigrating under the Act "is almost impossible
now").
208 Without some sort of proof of paternity, it is very difficult if not impossible to
prove that an Amerasian has any biological ties to a United States national (her physical
appearance notwithstanding) to confer United States citizenship on to her. However, as
discussed in Part II.C and elsewhere in this Note, it is also very difficult if not impossible
for an Amerasian to even locate let alone reunite with her American father after many years
of separation; in many cases, the father may have died on the battlefields long ago, he may
not be located, or he may simply refuse to acknowledge the relationship. There might not
be a complete resolution to this conflict. However, it is logical to say that, if an Amerasian
has been admitted into the United States through a rigorous program like the Homecoming
Act (including the requisite face-to-face interview(s) with United States personnel
overseas), they would carry with them the presumption of being the son or daughter of a
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As a less-burdensome alternative, Congress should grant automatic
citizenship to those Amerasians who had already resettled in the United States
through the Homecoming Act. The reasoning behind this is best captured through
statements made by Representative Zoe Lofgren, who in 2005 reintroduced the
Amerasian Naturalization Act, a bill that seeks to do precisely what is proposed
here and is currently pending in the House: 209
[T]hese individuals have lived through devastation during war, have been
mistreated by their governments because of their mixed race, and many
now live in the United States, but only as legal permanent residents.
There is no doubt that Amerasians are the sons and daughters of
American fathers. Our. Ame.riean government already made that
determination when we admitted the.m to the United States as legal
permanent residents ....
. . . It is time for us to finally close a chapter in our history that has
too long denied Amerasians the opportunity to become citizens and be
recognized as the Americans that they are. 2IO
An even less-burdensome alternative is for Congress to revise the deportation
rules for Amerasians to make deportation less common. Deportation is a harsh
measure, whether the courts view it as punishment or not; to liberally impose it on
persons who are genetically tied to the United States, and who are by accident of
birth mistreated by their native government and people, heightens the harshness of
the measure. Also, as seen above, when the United States passed the 1982
Amerasian Amendments and subsequently the Homecoming Act, it was in large
part influenced by the realization that its Amerasian children were living through
terrible conditions under Vietnam's repressive post-war communist regime. This

United States national. Unlike other immigrants who are admitted into the United States for
a variety of other reasons, but who must establish further ties to the United States before
they can become a naturalized citizen, an Amerasian who has been admitted into the
United States would already have a presumed biological tie to the United States. This,
among other reasons, supports granting Amerasians automatic citizenship, bypassing the
usual naturalization process. See Brief of Equality Now and Others as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 11 n.8, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071), 2000
WL 1702031 (noting that the law of many countries provides for transmission of
citizenship through fathers rather than mothers; therefore, section 309 operating in
conjunction with the law of these countries could cause many children who are born out of
wedlock to be stateless); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963)
(recognizing that the avoidance of statelessness is an "issue of the utmost import").
209 See supra note 138.
210 151 CONGo REc. Ell19-01 (daily ed. May 26, 2005) (statement of Sen. Lofgren),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-binlgetpage.cgi?dbname=2005_record&
page=Ell19&position=all.
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realization informed the United States government's original intention to classify
Amerasians as "refugees" under the Homecoming Act; and although it did not
carry out this intention, the United States treated Amerasians like designated
refugees nonetheless. 211
Ultimately, Congress should tackle the source of the problem: the sexist
mentality and sexual escapades of United States troops stationed abroad. Congress
should open a serious dialogue with the Pentagon and encourage it to clean up its
act, perhaps through incentives. Alternatively, Congress should mandate the
Pentagon's compliance by passing legislation expressly forbidding prostitution
overseas and providing serious criminal penalties for those who aid in or abet such
activity.212 If these troops decide to have irresponsible sex with women abroad,
they should at least be responsible for the children they subsequently create.
Imposing childrearing, or at least financial, responsibilities on these troops would
provide a disincentive for them to carelessly conceive and then abandon children
while simultaneously treating foreign women as mere sex objects. By taking such
action, the United States would be in a better position to hold itself out as a moral
leader of the world, and would demonstrate to the international community that it
is a nation that cares for its children.

See supra note 105.
Prostitution certainly does not have to be a necessary or inherent aspect of war or
the military, as it is controllable. See Chang, supra note 57, at 642-43 (noting that during
the Persian Gulf War, when U.S. troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. military
took that country's "sanctions against prostitution seriously" and that '''even before a
soldier could go near a local woman and get caught by Arabs [U.S. military personnel
would] get him' " (citation omitted)).
211
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